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 This thesis portfolio analyzes the balance between national security and freedom, 
and the safe guards in place designed to protect liberty while increasing security.  This 
portfolio finds that the impact of national security measures on citizens’ freedoms is not 
as substantial as conventional wisdom assumes and safeguards implemented to prevent 
such intrusion are functioning effectively.  
 The first chapter of this thesis portfolio tests the conventional wisdom that as 
national security increases freedoms must decrease.  After large events threatening 
national security occur it is presumed governments increase citizens’ security by 
restraining traditional freedoms.  By conducting a quantitative analysis of the level of 
terrorism and freedom within nine selected countries the evidence suggests after 
countries see a significant increase in the level of terrorism, freedom within that country 
does not decrease at a consistent observable level.   
 This thesis continues to look at the United States Government’s reaction to the 
September 11th attacks and the impact the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
State and Local Fusion Center Program has on citizens’ civil liberties, civil rights, and 
privacy.  This chapter finds the DHS State and Local Fusion Center Program minimally 
impacts citizens’ civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy and fulfills its statutory 
requirements to protect such rights while securing the homeland.    
 Finally, an analysis of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office for 
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) is conducted to determine if the proactive 
safeguard intended to limit US Government, and DHS’s intrusion on citizens is 
functioning as intended.   Based on a review of current program, published impact 
 ii 
assessments, and other publicly available information this chapter finds the Office of 
CRCL is effective in proactively protecting citizens’ civil rights and liberties. 
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 Public discussions on the appropriate balance between national security and 
citizens’ freedom have continually surged into the national spotlight since the terrorist 
attacks on September 11th, 2001.  Finding the appropriate balance between security and 
freedom is not a new issue and has been debated even before our founding fathers wrote 
the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights.  Benjamin Franklin famously wrote in 
1755 “Those who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, 
deserve neither liberty nor safety”.  Franklin’s quote is often cited as a battle cry for civil 
libertarians who denote governments’ intrusion on citizens’ freedoms and the need to 
prevent it.  As far back as Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, citizens discussed the struggle 
between security and freedom.  Although, the fullness of the debate between security and 
liberty cannot be satisfied within this paper, this thesis examines post 9/11 security 
policies, and programs designed to protect citizens’ rights in order to determine if the 
government has infringed on citizens’ freedom. 
 It is important for the public to discuss the appropriate balance between security 
and freedom because our country’s history shows that in times of crisis our government 
has the power to tilt the balance between security and freedom in favor of security.  
During World War II our government created internment camps for Japanese Americans, 
detaining Japanese immigrants without proper justification or due process in fear they 
were a threat to national security.  Further, after the United States was founded our 
government passed the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798 that were intended to counter the 
threat from France, but in reality restricted citizens severely. These acts increased the 
residency requirement for citizenship, allowed the President to deport or imprison anyone 
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“dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States" and severely restricted speech 
critical of the government, including in the press.1  In our nation’s history our 
government has, at times, tipped the balance in favor of security too far and this paper is 
a means to measure the balance between freedom and security in the post 9/11 era. 
 More recently, the National Security Agency (NSA) public disclosures in the 
summer of 2013 have resurrected debate about the appropriate balance between security 
and privacy in the post 9/11 era.  The NSA disclosures highlighted the cost of citizens’ 
privacy and civil liberties in the public sphere and reignited debate on the appropriateness 
of government programs that have been enacted since 9/11 in the name of security. To 
date no evidence has been uncovered that shows the NSA systematically or negligently 
went beyond the bounds of the law, although the disclosures have been interpreted by 
many to go beyond the spirit of those laws.  
 In the era of post 9/11 policies intended to counter the threat of terrorism, 
citizens’ liberties have not been thrown to the wayside.  The PATRIOT Act, despite 
criticisms for its intrusiveness, did incorporate a sunset clause that ensured the law would 
be reevaluated to balance the interest of security and liberty.  Furthermore, when the 
Department of Homeland Security was founded it included an Officer of Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties to represent the interests of citizens.  Other offices created after 9/11 such 
as the Office of Director of National Intelligence and the Terrorist Screen Center 
included offices of privacy and civil liberties to limit their impact on citizens. 
 The first chapter of this thesis tests the conventional wisdom that when a terrorist 
attack occurs causing mass casualties a government will react strongly by restricting 
1 US Library of Congress, “Primary Documents in American History” Accessed, 26 October 2014, 
Available at: http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Alien.html 
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citizens’ civil liberties in order to prevent further acts of terrorism, protect citizens, and 
prosecute the perpetrators. By analyzing data on the magnitude of terrorist attacks, and 
the level of freedom within a country, this chapter tests the aforementioned conventional 
wisdom.  The level of civil liberties within a country is quantified using the civil liberties 
index within the Freedom House “Freedom in the World” publication.  The level of 
terrorism within a country is quantified as the number of casualties per year recorded in 
the Global Terrorism Database. This research hypothesizes that, when terrorist attacks 
occur causing a large number of casualties, there will be a substantial decrease in the 
level of civil liberties in that country.   
 Nine countries - United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Pakistan, Turkey, 
Georgia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt - are analyzed in chapter one of this thesis to 
test the hypothesis that when a terrorist attack occurs a country will react by restricting 
citizens’ rights.  This chapter looks at those nine countries separated into three categories 
including free, partially free, and not free to determine if there is a relationship between a 
country’s predisposition for freedom and the country’s reaction to a terrorist event.  Data 
from 1990 through 2012 is used to determine trends occurring within a country and if 
citizens’ freedom changes in relation to any increases in casualties due to terrorism. 
 Findings from chapter one suggest that of the nine countries studied, those that 
were considered free saw no decrease in civil liberties, as recorded by Freedom House 
“Freedom in the World”.  The countries considered not free saw a slight reduction in civil 
liberties after high levels of casualties due to terrorism. The remaining three countries 
considered partially free saw little change in civil liberties after experiencing high level 
of casualties due to terrorism. By using the University of Maryland’s National 
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Consortium for the Study Of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) to measure the number of casualties per year within a 
country, along with Freedom House’s Civil Liberties Index, this chapter found little 
observable relationship between magnitudes of terrorism and a country’s level of civil 
liberties.   
 The second chapter of this thesis portfolio analyzes the Department of Homeland 
Security’s State and Local Fusion Center Program and its impact on citizens’ privacy, 
civil liberties, and civil rights. The chapter analyzes if the State and Local Fusion Center 
Program is meeting the guidelines and requirements set forth in the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 that requires the Department to protect citizens’ civil rights and civil liberties 
in its efforts to secure the homeland. This chapter will primarily analyze federal 
guidelines and regulations applicable to the State and Local Fusion Center Program.  
There is a unique necessity to critically evaluate the role that State and Local Fusion 
Centers play within the United States’ National Security paradigm because of their ability 
to leverage law enforcement and intelligence capabilities in addition to federal, state, and 
local resources, which prior to 9/11 were traditionally separate functions. 
 This chapter draws upon State and Local Fusion Center Program Office reports 
submitted to Congress, interviews with Fusion Center officials, DHS Office of Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties and Office of Privacy’s Impact Assessments publications, and 
other sources to analyze the impact the State and Local Fusion Center program has on 
communities and citizens. 2  This chapter looks further at the training and review 
processes in place to protect citizens’ civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy.   
2 See appendix A and B for DHS and DHS, Office of Intelligence and Analysis organization charts.  
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 Findings from an analysis of the DHS State and Local Fusion Center Program 
conclude the DHS is sufficiently protecting citizens’ civil rights and civil liberties while 
executing its State and Local Fusion Center Program intended to share information 
between Federal, State and Local Governments.  The DHS State and Local Fusion Center 
Program, with assistance from DHS components such as the Office for Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties, has instituted programs and training designed to educate and reinforce the 
importance of protecting civil rights and civil liberties while executing its mission of 
protecting the homeland.  This chapter also finds DHS has successfully guided the 
network of Fusion Centers in the implementation of programs designed to protect 
citizens’ rights, despite not having direct control of State and Local Fusion Centers. 
 The third chapter explores whether the Department of Homeland Security Office 
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is fulfilling its mission and if their actions are 
sufficient as defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and applicable regulations, 
executive orders, and directives.  The Office for CRCL is a safeguard built into the DHS 
that most other intelligence and law enforcement departments do not have. It is important 
to evaluate the utility of this office because of its uniqueness in law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies.  This chapter is designed to be a 10-year review of the Office for 
CRCL reviewing its role and effectiveness in preemptively protecting citizens’ civil 
rights and civil liberties. 
 To evaluate the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties this chapter looks 
at applicable statutes, regulations, executive orders, and directives that guide the day-to-
day and overall operations of the Office of CRCL to determine what standard they should 
be meeting in order to operate as intended.  The chapter proceeds by drawing upon 
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publicly available information released by DHS, the Government Accountability Office, 
and CRCL reports to Congress to evaluate the office’s activities.  By drawing upon these 
sources this chapter identifies actions by CRCL in pursuit of its statuary obligations. 
  Findings in chapter three conclude that the Office for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties is successfully involved in many aspects of oversight to ensure the Department 
of Homeland Security is protecting civil rights and civil liberties while also ensuring 
homeland security.  The office is fulfilling its mission and their actions are sufficient as 
defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and applicable regulations, executive 
orders, and directives. This paper recommends three ways the Office for CRCL and the 
DHS could increase transparency and increase citizens’ civil rights and civil liberties.  
First, the office could report metrics for its role in reviewing reports and policy.  Second, 
it needs to publicize when they are holding community engagement events before, not 
after, they occur.  Third, the office needs to show substantive evidence that the 
information the office is obtaining through engagement events is being incorporated in 
their proactive policy review program. 
 This portfolio finds no evidence of a seismic shift in the balance between citizens’ 
freedom and national security. Since the terrorist attacks in 2001 security has been a 
paramount priority within the United States and abroad, however citizens’ freedoms have 
not been diminished in pursuit of security.  Academics and journalists have written 
extensively on the balance between freedom and security in the post 9/11 era.  This thesis 
portfolio will focus on governments’ reactions to terrorism and the means to balance 




Research Question: Is there a relationship between the between the magnitude of 
terrorist attacks, and the level of citizens’ civil liberties within that country after the 
terrorist attack?   
 The research presented in this chapter tests the conventional wisdom that when a 
terrorist attack occurs causing mass casualties a government will react strongly by 
restricting citizens civil liberties in order to prevent further acts of terrorism, protect 
citizens, and prosecute the perpetrators. This chapter analyzes the relationship between 
the magnitude of terrorist attacks, and the level of citizens’ civil liberties within that 
country following an attack.  This chapter uses the Global Terrorism Database and the 
Freedom House index to quantify terrorism and civil liberties respectively.  This research 
hypothesizes that, when larger terrorist attacks occur causing more casualties, there will 
be a substantial decrease in the level of civil liberties in that country.   
 This chapter concludes that of the nine countries studied, those that were 
considered free saw no decrease in civil liberties, as recorded by Freedom House 
“Freedom in the World”.  The countries considered not free saw a slight reduction in civil 
liberties after high levels of casualties due to terrorism. The remaining three countries 
considered partially free saw little change in civil liberties after experiencing high level 
of casualties due to terrorism. By using the University of Maryland’s National 
Consortium for the Study Of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) to measure the number of casualties per year within a 
country, along with Freedom House’s Civil Liberties Index, this chapter analyzed 
whether there is an observable relationship between magnitudes of terrorism and that 
country’s level of civil liberties.   
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How the Terrorism Variable is Calculated 
 This chapter uses data collected by the University of Maryland’s National 
Consortium for the Study Of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) to measure the magnitude of terrorist attacks.   The GTD is an 
open source database that collects event information for all terrorist incidents around the 
world.3  The GTD categorizes incidents and includes 45 variables for each incident.  To 
measure the magnitude of the terrorist incidents this chapter uses the total number of 
casualties.  This variable includes both those injured and fatality injured during the 
attacks.   
 The START GTD has three criteria used to determine what events qualify as 
terrorist incidents.  First, “The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal.”  Second, “There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, 
intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the 
immediate victims.”  Third,  “The action must be outside the context of legitimate 
warfare activities, i.e. the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international 
humanitarian law (particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or 
non-combatants).”4  It is important to explicitly define terrorism because there is 
significant debate on how terrorism should be defined.5 
How the Civil Liberties Variable is Calculated 
3 University of Maryland (UMD), National Consortium for the Study Of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Last Accessed 11/5/2012, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
4 UMD, START, GTD, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/ 
5 Cooper, Harold HA. "Terrorism The Problem of Definition Revisited." American Behavioral Scientist 44, 
no. 6 (2001): 881-893. 
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 This chapter uses the civil liberties index in the Freedom House “Freedom in the 
World” publication for measuring the level of civil liberties within a country. Freedom 
House divides civil liberties in four sub-categories: (1) freedom of expression and belief, 
(2) freedom of association, (3) rule of law, and (4) personal autonomy and individual 
rights. The civil liberties index is based on 15 questions individually scored on a 0-4 scale 
and then aggregated to create the civil liberties index on a 0-60 scale.6  Freedom House 
has only recorded civil liberties on a 0-60 scale since 2003.  This scale is preferred over 
Freedom Houses 0-7 scale because the larger scale more accurately shows subtle changes 
in civil liberties.  This chapter uses the 0-60 scale when appropriate but, for terrorist 
events prior to 2003 it will be necessary to use Freedom House’s 0-7 scale. 
Nine Countries Selected for Analysis  
 This chapter looks at nine countries that the Freedom House “Freedom in the 
World” publication considers to be free, partially free, and not free.  The Freedom House 
rating which will be used to determine the countries status takes both political rights and 
civil liberties into account when creating it’s index on a 1-7 scale (1 representing the 
most free and 7 the least free).7 The Freedom House rating is made up of 10 political 
rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions in which countries receive 0 to 4 points 
per question (0 representing the least freedom; 4 representing the most freedom).  The 
assigned responses to the 25 questions are then averaged resulting in the Freedom House 
rating known as the “freedom rating”.  The Freedom House rating assigns countries a 
6 Freedom House, Last Accessed 11/5/2012, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
2012/methodology 
7 House, Freedom. "Freedom in the World 2013." Democratic breakthroughs in the balance (2013). 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2013/methodology#.UwKgSEJdXqY 
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status by applying the following scale: Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not 
Free (5.5 to 7.0).8 
 This chapter will look at nine countries that are, as of 2012, considered to be free, 
partially free, and not free as recorded by Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” 
rating.  The free countries this research will analyze are United States, United Kingdom, 
and Spain; the not free countries are Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt; and the partially 
free countries include Pakistan, Turkey, and Georgia.  This research has selected these 
nine countries as a sampling of countries that have had large fluctuations in the level of 
terrorism as recorded by the Global Terrorism Database.9  Furthermore, analyzing 
countries that are free, partially free and not free will include countries whose preexisting 
civil liberties environment are at all points along the civil liberties index. For example, if 
a country is free it will be hard to analyze if that country gains any freedom after a 
terrorist attack, and vise versa for not free countries. For this reason this research includes 
countries across the civil liberties spectrum. 
Background on the Terrorism and Civil Liberties Balance 
 When large terrorist attacks occurs causing a significant number of casualties we 
expect a stronger response from the government than if terrorist attacks are small or fail 
to cause numerous casualties.  In response to the September 11th terrorist attacks targeting 
the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and Flight 93, the government reasoned, in order to 
effectively fight this new adversary it needed new tools.  These new tools that the 
government used to fight terrorism included restricting citizens’ civil liberties. Through 
legislation such as the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
8 Freedom House, 2013 
9 Freedom House, 2013 
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Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) we saw the 
government broaden its ability to fight terrorist and perceived threats to the United States 
homeland. 10  
 Surveillance initiatives that were included in the Patriot Act, such as the roving 
wiretaps, modernized counter terrorism investigative powers by allowing warrants to 
follow the individual and not the single device as before.  Roving wiretaps allowed the 
government to follow an individual with a warrant and listen to his or her 
communication.  Previously, separate warrants were required to listen to a subject’s 
communication on different devices they used. This initiative is argued not to have 
infringed on citizens rights but upgraded counter terrorism investigation tools to the 21st 
century.11  In an era when a subject could purchase and dispose of several cellular phones 
at their convenience, these measures helped level the playing field for investigators. 
 Further, provisions the Department of Justice implemented such as detainee-
lawyer communication monitoring were highly criticized by some and defended by 
others.  Supporting scholars assert that such privileges were only used when there was 
reasonable suspicion that such communications may facilitate future acts of violence and 
terrorism.12   If an attorney was abusing such rights in order to facilitate terrorism, with 
reasonable suspicion, the government could monitor conversations. Attorney General 
John Ashcroft exercised this privilege prior to the indictment of Attorney Lynne Stewart 
who was later convicted of terrorism related charges while representing Sheik Omar 
10 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107 –56. 115 Stat. 272 
(2001). Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/PLAW- 
107publ56.pdf 
11 Tin, Jan C. "Unobjectionable But Insufficient” 
12 Tin, Jan C. "Unobjectionable But Insufficient” p 1151 
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Rahman, a participant in the first World Trade Center Bombing in 1993.13  Lynne 
Stewart was accused and convicted of providing material support to terrorists.  Stewart 
used her client attorney confidentiality privileges to facilitate “the blind Sheik's” terrorist 
planning and communication. 
 Immigration policy following 9/11 changed dramatically and supporters cite such 
changes were necessary in order to prevent further abuse of our immigration system by 
terrorists.  The Patriot Act clarifies that providing material support for terrorism 
constitutes terrorist activity and is a deportable act. Further, the creation of various 
terrorist watchlists has created a measure of screening that was not previously 
established.14  Various terrorist watchlists maintained by the US Government prevent 
known or suspected terrorists from obtaining legal entry into the United States through 
ports of entry. Supporters of stricter immigration policy cite that non-US citizens have 
fewer rights and thus stricter scrutiny can be legally applied to immigrants in the name of 
counter terrorism and national security.  It is known that terrorists have abused visa and 
immigration programs in an attempt to gain legal access into the United States.   
Imposing harsher restrictions to our immigration system to prevent potential terrorists 
from entering the US is argued to be well within our laws. 
 The steps taken by the US Government to fight terrorism were intended to prevent 
another large-scale terrorist attack from occurring within our borders.  In support of that 
effort the federal government has expanded the role state, local, and tribal governments 
play in the intelligence community, post 9/11. The government was trying to better 
13 Johnson, Kevin R. "Civil Liberties Post-September 11: A Time of Danger, a Time of 
Opportunity." Seattle J. Soc. Just. 2 (2003): 3. 
14 Tin, Jan C. "Unobjectionable But Insufficient” 
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“connect the dots” between seemingly insignificant and disparate pieces of information 
that may when put together prevent an attack within the homeland. 
 The federal government was looking to partner closer with local, state, and tribal 
governments to facilitate information sharing.  These new programs positioned local and 
state governments to act as intelligence collectors adding information to the broader 
intelligence picture.  Further, this same information collected by law enforcement for 
intelligence purposes could also be used for prosecuting potential criminal and terrorists.  
The new role of law enforcement plays in intelligence matters blurs the line between two.  
Previously, intelligence and law enforcement were separated because of the different due 
process procedures needed in the court law.   
 The Federal Government recognized after 9/11 that small disparate pieces of 
information might be of greater significance when put into the big picture.  For example, 
if a state of local police officer pulls a driver suspicious driver over for speeding, by it 
self that information is of no value.  Now, if that information is merged with the federal 
governments knowledge that he has links to terrorism it become more significant.  
Furthermore, it becomes even more significant if the law enforcement officer notice he 
had several bags of fertilizer in his back seat15 of his car and the subject’s license said he 
lives in an apartment in Northwest, Washington DC. 
Previous Academic Studies 
 Previous research has analyzed governments’ reactions to terrorism through the 
use of both quantitative and qualitative methods.  There is an active discussion amongst 
15 Fertilizer is a commonly used chemical to create homemade explosives. 
 13 
                                                        
scholars about the relationship between governments and terrorism.16 17 18  Discussions 
include studies that look at different countries, their types of governments, and their 
relation to terrorism. The academic discussion on the relationship between governments 
and terrorism divide roughly into two schools of thought. Those that assert democracies 
encourage terrorism and terrorism is more prevalent in democratic countries.  The second 
school includes those that believe democracy deters terrorism and terrorism is more 
prevalent in restrictive authoritarian countries. 
 Initial studies on the relationship between democracy and terrorism, relevant to 
the current discussion of terrorism, started with William Lee Eubanks and Leonard 
Weinburg’s article “Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?”  Eubank and Weinburg 
were not the first academics to study the relationship between terrorism and a countries’ 
political structure in which it occurs, but they were the first modern and relevant attempt 
to empirically study the relationship between the presences of terrorist groups and 
democracies.   Eubank and Weinburg lead the discussion finding that democratic 
governments have more terrorist groups present than non-democratic countries.19   They 
used data from the “World Directory of Terrorist and Other Organizations Associated 
with Guerrilla Warfare, Political Violence and Protest” which organizes terrorist groups 
by country of origin.  They also used “Democracy: a worldwide Survey” for the 
classification of countries’ regime type.  Eubank and Weinburg found that democracies 
have a high presence of terrorist groups.  Their study, although one of the first to measure 
16 Eubank, W. L. and L. Weinberg. 1994. "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?" Terrorism and 
Political Violence 6 (4): 417-435. 
17 Eubank, W. & Weinberg, E, 1998. “Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose.” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 10:1: 108-118 
18 Sandler, T. 1995. "On the Relationship between Democracy and Terrorism." Terrorism and Political 
Violence 7 (4): 1-9. 
19 Eubank, W. L. and L. Weinberg. 1994. "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?" Terrorism and Political 
Violence 6 (4): 417-435.  
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the level of terrorist groups, fails to account for the significance these terrorist groups 
play within their countries.   Scholars have looked at Eubanks and Weinburg’s and 
objected to their findings asserting that the there is no relationship between democracy 
and terrorism and the data used is faulted.20   
 Other research has found evidence to challenge the findings of Eubank,Weinberg, 
and scholars who support the positive relationship between democracy and terrorism.   
First, the scholars who reject this relationship have challenged the evidence presented by 
William Lee Eubanks and Leonard Weinburg on methodological grounds asserting that 
the statistical analysis performed is faulted, and the variables used are not accurate in 
order to support their findings.  Todd Sandler makes a case for using terrorist event data 
rather than presence of terrorist group data as used by Eubank and Weinburg in their 
initial research.21 Sandler points to several factors that make using the presence of 
terrorist groups a faulty source of data for measuring terrorist activities.  First, countries 
that are authoritarian in nature and restrict citizens’ civil liberties are more likely to 
underreport terrorist group activity or presence.  Sandler further supports the use of event 
data because it is more difficult for restrictive countries to underreport or hide terrorist 
events, than it is for them not to acknowledge the existence of terrorist groups.22  Further, 
Sandler sites how “spill over terrorism” is not accounted for in Eubank and Weinbergs 
study.  There are countries that may experience several terrorist events but not be the 
home base for any particular terrorist group.  With Sandlers focus on the importance of 
the data used and the source of the information researchers continued to look for new 
20 Sandler, T. 1995. "On the Relationship between Democracy and Terrorism." Terrorism and Political 
Violence 7 (4): 1-9.  
21 Sandler, T. 1995. 
22 Sandler, T. 1995. 
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data sources to study the relationship between terrorism and the countries in which it 
occurs. 
 With this new data in hand scholars have presented evidence that terrorism is 
more often found in countries that are not democratic, contrary to past findings.  Max 
Abrahms used yet another dataset to analyze terrorism and country type finding 
democracies do not have a higher presence of international terrorism.23  Abrahms used 
the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), Worldwide Incident Tracking System 
(WITS) data and found, of the top 10 countries most frequently targeted by terrorist, only 
two of the were free countries.24 Abrahms points to traditional used data sets that track 
terrorism, such as the RAND-St Andrews, Department of State, and ITERATE databases, 
which disproportionately track international terrorism while overlooking domestic 
terrorism because these databases were designed primarily for policy makers most 
interested in international terrorism.25 For the country variable Abrahms used the 
Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” ranking to determine countries’ level of 
democracy.  Amongst Abrahms’ findings he determined that not free countries were 
twice as likely to have terrorist incidents and as much as six times as many fatalities as 
free countries. These findings go against previous analysis by Eubank and Weinberg that 
has determined free democracies were more likely to sees terrorist events.  
New Study Presented 
 Following Sandlers’s analysis and suggestion that event data would be a better 
measure for the presence of terrorism, Eubanks and Weinberg’s published another paper 
23 Abrahms, M. "Why Democracies make Superior Counterterrorists." 
24 Abrahms, M. "Why Democracies make Superior Counterterrorists." 
25 Abrahms, M. "Why Democracies make Superior Counterterrorists." 
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in 1998 addressing these questions and concerns.26  While using event data (opposed to 
group data) gathered by the US State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism and 
Rand-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, Eubank and Wienberg again 
found that “terrorist events are far more likely to occur in free and democratic settings 
than any other alternative.”27  In addition to these findings they also found that countries 
that have recently underwent a regime change were more likely to experience terrorism 
than countries, which have not.28 
 Since these studies, other scholars have used a variety of variables and data sets to 
analyze the relationship between democracy and terrorism.  Among these, scholars have 
used the frequency of terrorist attacks29 terrorist attacks according to their location, the 
perpetrator’s nationality, and the victim nationality, among other variables. 30  Eubank 
and Wienberg in their 2001 study again found by using frequency of terrorist event data 
that free countries31 are more likely to see high levels of terrorist attacks compared to 
countries that are not free. 32  Specifically, they analyzed the relationship between 
terrorism and democracy by using Robert Wessons classification of how countries were 
ruled in the mid 1980’s33 in comparison to the frequency with which there citizens were 
either victimized or perpetrated by terrorist attacks according to the ITERATE 
(International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, 1978-1990, ITERATE III). 
26 Eubank, W. & Weinberg, E, 1998. “Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose.” 
27 Eubank, W. & Weinberg, E, 1998. 
28 Eubank, W. & Weinberg, E, 1998. 
29 Eubank, W. & Weinberg, E, 1998. 
30 Eubank, W. & Weinberg, E. 2001. " Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims” 
31 Free Countries are Defined by Freedom House Freedom in the World for 1984-1985 
32 Eubank, W. & Weinberg, E. 2001. " Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims” 
33 Wesson, Robert, (Ed.) 1987, “Democracy: A Worldwide Survey” New York: Praeger 
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Again, for the third time their study found that terrorism is most likely to occur in stable 
democracies.34 
Theories on the Causes of Terrorism 
 There is a robust discussion on the causes of terrorism, why it occurs, how 
terrorism works, and what the effects are.35  While attempting to understand the effects of 
terrorism, scholars have also sought to understand the relationship between terrorism and 
democracy, and more broadly the relationship between terrorism and the countries in 
which it occurs.  Those that assert that there is a positive correlation between terrorism 
and democracy believe this is due to the freedoms and civil liberties associated with 
democracy36.  Citizens within a democracy often have freedom of speech, movement, 
and assembly which terrorists are thought to exploit in order to facilitate their actions 
unnoticed by law enforcement and other governmental entities tasked with protecting 
there country from threats foreign and domestic in origin.37  Those that assert that 
terrorism is more likely in countries that are non democratic and have less civil liberties 
reason that this is because citizens’ have no way to express their political will and 
opinion, opposing their current political situation, in peaceful means.38 
 Arguing against the relationship between democracy and terrorism scholars 
reason democracies are great counter terrorism mechanisms in and of them selves due to 
the outlets and avenues they provide for citizens to voice their political opinions and 
influence their government and the laws they implement39.  Democratic governments are 
34 Eubank, W. & Weinberg, E. 2001. " Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims” 
35 Crenshaw, M. 1981. "The Causes of Terrorism." Comparative Politics 13 (4): 379-399.  
36 Eubank, W. & Weinberg, E, 1998. “Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose.” 
37 LI, Quan. 2005. "Does Democracy Promote Or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 49:278-297 
38 LI, Quan. 2005. 
39 Abrahms, M. 2007. "Why Democracies make Superior Counterterrorists." 
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representative of its citizens by definition and citizens’ ideal, opinions, and values are 
represented in the government. 40  Further, democracies provide an avenue for its citizens 
to express dissent and influence change within their government.  Free and fair elections 
in democracy also promote non-violent means of creating political and policy change.  
Furthermore, when there is a conflict amongst groups, the courts allow for an impartial 
resolution to the issue.41 
 The opposing argument is that free and democratic countries are more likely to 
experience acts of terrorism perpetrated against them.  Supporting this argument, scholars 
suggest that open democratic societies facilitate terrorism because it allows perpetrators 
to plan and execute activities relativity unnoticed and at little cost.42  Further, as Abrhams 
acknowledges, although democratic societies have little tolerance for attacks perpetrated 
on their population, they have also made a commitment to adhere to a high level of civil 
liberties that makes them vulnerable.  While maintaining their expected level of civil 
liberties it makes it difficult for free societies to adopt harsh measures to counter 
terrorism and possibly prevent future attacks.43  In line with this argument, assuming 
terrorists are rational actors, they would choose to attack democracies because they have 
a greater chance of receiving concessions and their actions resulting in political change.44 
 The existing literature and studies analyzing the relationship between terrorism 
and the environments that it occurs in have looked at numerous variables including 
terrorist groups and where they exist, terrorist events and where they occurs, in addition 
to the ideological reasons why terrorist attack the targets they do.  This chapter will look 
40 Abrahms, M. 2007. "Why Democracies make Superior Counterterrorists."  
41 Schmid, A. P. "Terrorism and Democracy."  
42 Li, Quan 2005 
43 Abrahms, Max, 2007. 
44 Ibid. 
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more closely at the relationship between terrorist attacks, and how the level of civil 
liberties changes after an attack.  
Method of Analysis 
 This chapter will analyze if there is an observable relationship between the level 
of civil liberties and casualties due to terrorism within a country and if countries’ civil 
liberties decrease after large increases in the level of terrorism.  In order to determine if 
there is a relationship, this chapter will use the data gathered from the START database 
and the Freedom House “Freedom in the World” publication.  These two data sets will be 
plotted on the same line graph for each country analyzed.  The graph will present the 
number of casualties due to terrorism on the left y-axis and the countries’ civil liberties 
index on the right y-axis.  The x-axis will have the corresponding years from 1990 
through 2011. Graph 1.1 displays how the graph will be presented and this chapter’s 
proposed hypothesis.  Analyzing the data and plotting it on the graph will establish if 
there is suggestive relationship between the magnitude of terrorist incidents and level of 
civil liberties.  The number of casualties for each country will be presented across time 
from 1990 to 2011 across the x-axis.  This total includes the number of people killed, and 
injured for each incident in the year, including the perpetrator if they were killed or 
injured.   
Analysis of the level of Terrorism and Civil Liberties 
 When comparing the number of casualties due to terrorism to the level of civil 
liberties in a country, conventional wisdom suggests as the level of terrorism increases, 
the level of civil liberties will decrease. Of the nine countries selected and analyzed in 
this chapter, this relationship is not seen in three countries categorized a “free” country.  
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Only a slight relation can be seen in “partially free” and “not free” countries between the 
magnitude of terrorist event and the level of civil liberties within those countries. 
Graph 1.1 Hypothesized Graph of Casualties and Civil liberties 
 
Free Countries Terrorism and Civil Liberties Analysis 
United States  
 The United States (US) experienced its worst terrorist attack in its history when 
Al Qaeda attacked on 11 September 2001 causing approximately 3000 casualties.  In 
1995 the United States also saw a spike to 906 casualties due to terrorism as a result of 
the Oklahoma City Bombing perpetrated by Timothy McVeigh.   The 2001 and 1995 
increases in causalities due to terrorism are clearly evident on graph 1.2 and 1.3.  
Following the terrorist attacks in 2001, The United States’ civil liberties index (CLI) 
fluctuated between 55 and 56 on the 60 point scale from 2003 to 2008, as seen in graph 
1.3.45 The fluctuation seen on graph 1.3 between 55-56 may be a result of changing 
counter terrorism policy and its effect on civil liberties, although the US’s overall rating 





























                                                        
remained very high on the over CLI and the fluctuation small.  Additionally, the 
fluctuation may only be seen on the 0-60 scale, and not the 1-7 scale, because the larger 
scale can more accurately show fluctuations in the CLI.   According to the Freedom 
House Index 7 point scale, The United States maintained a CLI of 1 from 1990 through 
2011.46  The overall level of civil liberties is still considerably high even amongst other 
free countries such as Spain, and Great Britain, who maintained approximately a 57 to 53 
CLI and 56 to 55 CLI respectively during the same time period. The hypothesis presented 
in this chapter is not supported by the data for the United States. No change in civil 
liberties is evident after increases in the level of terrorism within the United States. 


































                                                        
Graph 1.3 United States Level of Terrorism and Civil Liberties (60 point Scale) 
 
Great Britain  
 Great Britain has also experienced a significant threat of terrorism throughout the 
past two decades.  Throughout the 1990’s the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was a 
significant threat conducting attacks on British interests in order to obtain political ends.  
Following 2001, international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda became a primary 
concern for Great Britain.  On 7 July 2005, four suicide bombers who subscribed to Al 
Qaeda’s violent Islamic ideology attacked Great Britain’s underground train system 
causing approximately 700 casualties.   The 7/7 attacks were the largest attacks since 
1990s. Graph 1.4 displays data from the Global Terrorism Database as evidence of the 
significant threat from terrorism Great Britain experienced throughout the 1990’s and the 
































Graph 1.4 Great Britain Civil Liberty Index (7 Point Scale) and Terrorism Casualties 
 
 Great Britain’s CLI overtime, compared to the number of casualties from 
terrorism does not support the hypothesis that GB’s CLI would decline as terrorism 
casualties increased.  After experiencing sustained threats from terrorism, and several 
spikes in casualties from terrorism throughout the 1990’s, Great Britain’s CLI did not 
decline.  In fact Great Britain has maintained an overall high CLI throughout the past two 
decades as seen on graph 1.4 and 1.5.  Additionally, after experiencing a spike in 
casualties from 2003 to 2008, GB’s CLI fluctuated between 55 and 56 and stayed steady 
at 56 from 2008 on.  The consistently high overall level of civil liberties in Great Britain 
nullifies the presented hypothesis.  Moreover, Great Britain’s CLI from 1990 to 2004 
actually increases 1 point on the 7 point scale at a time when Great Britain was 
experiencing an increase in the number of casualties due to terrorism.  This is in evidence 
negates the hypothesis that civil liberties would decline after the 7/7/2005 London 
































Graph 1.5 Great Britain Civil Liberty Index (60 Point Scale) and Terrorism Casualties 
 
Spain 
 On 11 March 2004 Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, a violent Islamic extremist group 
associated with Al Qaeda attacked Madrid, Spain by placing 10 bombs in commuter 
trains causing approximately 2000 casualties.47  Following the 2004 train bombing 
Spain’s CLI increased from 53 in 2004 to 57 in 2006 on the 60 point CLI as displayed on 
graph 1.7.  Furthermore, Spain’s CLI increased from 2 in 2003 to 1 on the 7 point CLI in 
2004 and was sustained until 2011 as seen in graph 1.6.  This evidence rejects the 
hypothesis that as casualties due to terrorism increase civil liberties index will decrease.  
The change in Spain’s CLI suggests that after a terrorist attack occurs a government does 
not restrict it’s citizens civil liberties, but may in fact increases them slightly.  Similar to 
Great Britain, when Spain saw an increase in casualties due to terrorism their CLI did not 
decrease. 
 
47 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2012). Global 
































                                                        
Graph 1.6 Spain Civil Liberty Index (7 Point Scale) and Terrorism Casualties 
 
Graph 1.7 Spain Civil Liberty Index (60 Point Scale) and Terrorism Casualties 
 
Partially Free Countries Terrorism and Civil Liberties Analysis 
Turkey 
 In 1992 Turkey experienced a surge of casualties due to terrorism that exceeded 
1000.  During this time Turkey was involved in an escalated conflict with the Kurdistan 
Workers' Party, also known as the PKK.  Following Turkey’s escalated level of casualties 
in 1992 they experienced a shift in their civil liberties index recorded by Freedom House.  
Graph 1.8 displays Turkey’s decreased level of civil liberties from 1990 through 2002 
and their increase in causalities throughout the early part of the 90’s.  Turkey’s CLI was a 


















































 The Freedom House’s 60-point CLI does not provide more detailed information 
on Turkey’s level of civil liberties in the 1990’s because the 60 point CLI was not used 
until 2003.  The 60 point CLI (Graph 1.9) does however show that throughout the 2000’s, 
when Turkey’s level of casualties due to terrorism was relatively low, compared to its 
level in the 1990s, their level of civil liberties remained consistently high.  Although, 
Turkey’s CLI was higher than it was in the 1990’s it was still relatively low compared to 
free countries such as the US, Great Britain, and Spain who all maintained CLI between 1 
and 2 on the 7 point index.  
 The decreased level of civil liberties during a time of increased casualties due to 
terrorism, as seen on graph 1.8, is consistent with this chapter’s hypothesis that after a 
country experiences a large terrorist attack civil liberties will decrease. The change in 
CLI that Turkey experienced is very different than that observed by countries considered 
free by Freedom House.  In countries considered free by Freedom House, after a rise in 
casualties, the level of civil liberties did not decrease as observed with Turkey’s data. 






























Graph 1.9 Turkey Civil Liberty Index (60 Point Scale) and Terrorism Casualties 
 
Pakistan 
 Pakistan has had a substantially high level of casualties due to terrorism 
throughout the past two decades.  This reached a 20-year high in 2009 when 
approximately 7000 people were killed due to terrorism. Pakistan’s history is complex 
consisting of conflicts between many factions within it’s population.  Many of the 
terrorist attacks in the later half of the 2000’s can be attributed to the Tehrik-i-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP) who increased the number of attacks in order to influence the Pakistani 
Government.48  Considering Pakistan’s historically high level of unrest, conventional 
wisdom and the hypothesis for this chapter expects that their CLI would decrease 
throughout the past 20 years.   
 Graph 1.10 displays Pakistan’s high level of casualties due to terrorism 
throughout the past 20 years and increase throughout the later part of the 2000’s. On the 
48 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2012). Global 






























                                                        
7-point CLI Pakistan’s level of civil liberties remained constant at a 5.  Pakistan’s level of 
civil liberties is consistent with the high level of casualties.   
 Graph 1.11 displays a slight decrease in Pakistan’s level of civil liberties between 
2007 and 2010 while Pakistan experienced a slight increase in terrorism.   In 2007 
Pakistan experienced an increase to over 3000 casualties and the next year their CLI 
dropped to 18 from 24 the previous year.  This is the only noticeable change in Pakistan’s 
CLI throughout the 21 year sample in which they continually experience high levels of 
terrorism.  Pakistan’s relationship between civil liberties and terrorism supports this 
chapter’s hypothesis, although the relationship is weak due to Pakistan’s other spikes in 
terrorism and little movement in its CLI.  Pakistan’s level of civil liberties and terrorism 
does not strongly support the hypothesis for this chapter. 


































Graph 1.11 Pakistan Civil Liberty Index (60 Point Scale) and Terrorism Casualties  
 
Georgia 
 Throughout the past twenty years Georgia has not experienced a substantial 
number of casualties due to terrorism as displayed on graph 1.12 and 1.13.  Georgia 
experienced its largest number of casualties in 1992 and 1998 with approximately 80 
casualties in those respective years.  The global terrorism database attributes the attacks 
in 1992 to the Abkhazian Separatists who fought the Georgian government leading to the 
1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia War.49  Although, the level of civil liberties within Georgia 
has remained moderate throughout the past two decades, registering a 4 from 1996-2006 
and only fluctuating one point plus or minus outside that time, Georgia’s civil liberties 
level has slowly increased overall since 1992.  Georgia’s overall level of civil liberties is 
low in comparison to other countries that have had low levels of terrorism such as the 
United States, Great Britain, and Spain. Georgia’s relationship between civil liberties and 
terrorism does not support the hypothesis of this chapter.  Georgia’s CLI has not 































                                                        
Graph 1.12 Georgia Civil Liberty Index (7 Point Scale) and Terrorism Casualties 
 
Graph 1.13 Georgia Civil Liberty Index (60 Point Scale) and Terrorism Casualties  
 
Not Free Countries Terrorism and Civil Liberties Analysis  
Russia  
 From 1996 to 2004 Russia’s casualties due to terrorism have steadily risen until 
they reached a high of approximately 1800 casualties in 2004.  A majority of this unrest 
can be attributed to the Chechnya Conflict in which Chechnya sought independence and 
self-governance from Moscow.50  This conflict reached its boiling point in 2004 during 





















































                                                        
of over 1100 people.51  Russia experienced a slight decrease in its level of civil liberties 
from 1992 to 2011.  Russia’s CLI on the 7-point scale decreased from a 3 in 1992 to a 5 
in 2000-2011.  Russia’s civil liberties have decreased throughout the past two decades but 
there does not appear to be a substantial decrease in the level of civil liberties following a 
period of high casualties as displayed on graph 1.14 and 1.15.  The relationship observed 
supports the hypothesis in part and refutes it in part too.  It supports the notion that as 
more casualties are attributed to terrorism civil liberties will decrease, but there does not 
appear to be an observable reaction due to a single terrorist event or specific time period.  
Graph 1.14 Russia Civil Liberty Index (7 Point Scale) and Terrorism Casualties 
 


























































                                                        
Egypt 
 Throughout the past two decades Egypt has seen several spikes in the number of 
casualties due to terrorism. The first spike in the number of causalities due to terrorism 
was from 1994 to 1997 and the second from 2003 to 2006, both can be seen on graph 
1.16. The first rise is attributed to the rise in activity by Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and the 
Luxor Massacre in 1997.52  The second rise in terrorism seen on graph 1.16 the GTD 
attribute to the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, an Al Qaeda affiliate who on 23 July 2005 
conducted an attack in Sharm Al-Shaykh, Egypt using 3 suicide car bombs.53 
 Egypt’s CLI index on the Freedom House 7-point scale has remained low 
throughout the 90’s and 2000’s fluctuating between a 5 and 6 but never shifting in one 
direction significantly following a spike in causalities.  Looking at the Freedom house 60 
point CLI on graph 1.17, in 2006 there is a slight increase in the level of civil liberties 
within Egypt following the 2005 attacks and the resulting increase in casualties.  Egypt’s 
terrorism and civil liberties data not support this chapter’s hypothesis or conventional 
wisdom, although because Egypt has a low CLI it may be difficult to observe a large 











                                                        
Graph 1.16 Egypt Civil Liberty Index (7 Point Scale) and Terrorism Casualties 
 
Graph 1.17 Civil Liberty Index (60 Point Scale) and Terrorism Casualties 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 Throughout the 21-year period observed on graph 1.18 Saudi Arabia (SA) has 
experienced a relatively low level of terrorism recorded by the GTD, although Saudi 
Arabia saw a significant increase in terror activity in 2004 amounting to approximately 
300 casualties.  The most notable attack was the Al-Khobar Massacre on 29 May 2004 






















































which resulted in approximately 22 deaths and more the 148 wounded.54  The group was 
motivated by ideologies similar to Al Qaeda central and called for an end to western 
intervention in the Arabian Peninsula while claiming the west was starving them of their 
resources.55  Following this attack the level of civil liberties changed. 
 Graph 1.19 displays how following Saudi Arabia’s 2004 increase in casualties 
their civil liberties index surprisingly increased from the lowest index of 7 to 6 on the 7-
point CLI scale. On the 60-point scale Saudi Arabia’s CLI actually increased 3 points 
following the spike in casualties. 
 The observed movement in Saudi Arabia’s CLI does not substantial support this 
chapters hypothesis.  The observed relationship actually refutes the hypothesis because it 
provides another example of a country experiencing an increase in casualties and an 
increase in civil liberties, albeit small. Saudi Arabia’s CLI was very low prior to the spike 
in causalities and did not have any direction to go but up, although the hypothesis of this 
chapter would expect SA’s CLI to decease or remain at the lowest level follow the 2004 














                                                        
Graph 1.18 Saudi Arabia Civil Liberty Index (7 Point Scale) and Terrorism Casualties 
 
Graph 1.19 Saudi Arabia Civil Liberty Index (60 Point Scale) and Terrorism Casualties 
 
Findings 
 This chapter predicted that after a large terrorist attack occurred, causing higher 
number of casualties, the level of civil liberties would decrease within that country.  This 
relationship was not observed in most countries studied.  Table 1 provides what 
relationships were observed within the nine countries analyzed.  In free countries, after 
casualties due to terrorism rose, civil liberties did not substantially decrease; in fact Spain 
in 2004 saw civil liberties increase after experience a rise in terrorism.  Partially free 
countries saw little to no relation between the number of casualties due to terrorism and 

























































1992 when casualties exceeded 1000.  Not free countries also observed only a slight 
variation in civil liberties after rise in casualties due to terrorism.    
Table 1.1 Findings 
 
 


















Key   
~   No observable relationship 
^   Increase in civil liberties index following an increase in casualties 
V  Decrease in civil liberties index following an increase in casualties 
Green   Supports Hypothesis 
Yellow   Neither Supports nor Refutes hypothesis 
Red   Refutes Hypothesis 
 
 Of the nine countries studied three countries, only Turkey, Pakistan, and Russia 
saw a decrease in civil liberties after an increase in casualties due to terrorism.  This 
relationship was small within the countries it was observed and not as significant as 
hypothesized.   
 No relationship was seen within the United States, Great Britain, and Egypt to 
either support or nullify the proposed hypothesis.  Although all countries analyzed 
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experienced a noticeable increase in terrorism at one point, their level of civil liberties 
neither increased nor decreased following these events. 
 Spain, Georgia, and Saud Arabia experienced slight increases in civil liberties 
following periods of increased terrorism, directly refuting the proposed hypothesis for 
this chapter.  This relationship was unexpected and against conventional wisdom, 
especially since each of the three countries this relationship was observed in was within 
one of the three categories, free, partially free and not free, and not isolated to only one 
type of country. 
Potential Flaws in Research 
 Using the Freedom House “Freedom in the World” data set to measure the level 
of civil liberties hindered the ability to observe any significant changes in level of civil 
liberties. The civil liberties index, which was recorded on a 7 point scale prevented any 
smaller changes in the level of civil liberties from appearing on the index.  The 0-60 civil 
liberties index was preferable scale to use, but was only recorded since 2003.  The 60-
point scale allowed for smaller changes in the level of civil liberties to be observed.  Due 
to this limitation, further research could utilize a different data set that is more accurate 
and shows smaller changes in the level of civil liberties.  Also, researchers could look at 
specific terrorist attacks that have occurred after 2003 and policy that may have been 
implemented in response to those attacks. 
Areas for Future Research 
 Further research can be done to examine the legislative response governments 
have taken in response to terrorist attacks.   After a terrorist attack is perpetrated upon a 
country, governments may pass legislation in order to portray they are getting tough on 
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terrorism and taking measures to protect its citizens. For example, in response to 
September 11th terrorist attacks the United States past substantial legislation to support 
law enforcement, and the intelligence community’s ability to counter terrorism.  
 Future research may look at performing a regression analysis for several years to 
help determine if the magnitude of terrorism caused a change in civil liberties within that 
country.  If a regression analysis was conducted the independent variable would be the 
magnitude of the terrorist incidents, and the dependent variable would be the level of 
civil liberties.  Variables that would need to be controlled for include civil war, 
international war, regime type, gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita), 
population size, and signature of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
have been found to influence human rights performance.56  These variables are known to 
influence the level of civil liberties and terrorist incidents within a country (both 










56 Piazza, J. A. and J. I. Walsh. "Transnational Terror and Human Rights." 
 International Studies Quarterly 53 (1): 125-148. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
What is the Department of Homeland Security, State and Local Fusion Center Program’s 
impact on citizens’ privacy, civil liberties and civil rights?  
 State and Local Fusion Centers are complex organizations often governed by a 
combination of Federal, State, and Local laws while integrating a variety of law 
enforcement and intelligence capabilities that require careful oversight to ensure they do 
not infringe on citizens’ rights. The chapter analyzes if the State and Local Fusion Center 
program is meeting the guidelines and requirements to protect citizens’ civil liberties, 
rights, and privacy, asset forth in “The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007” (9/11 Commission Act), which amended the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, among other governing statutes and executive orders.57  
Why create Fusion Centers? 
State and Local Fusion Centers were created in response to the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004), hereafter referred to as 
9/11 Commission, that found the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 were partially 
successful due to the government’s inability to successfully share information between 
Federal State, and Local agencies.58  The former’s failure to share information between 
State, Local, and Federal agencies is the function of today’s Fusion Centers.  Although 
Fusion Centers are a product of the 9/11 Commission recommendations they have also 
been significantly influenced by the Homeland Security Act, the Intelligence Reform Act 
57 Congress, U. S. "Implementing recommendations of the 9/11 commission act of 2007." In 110th 
Congress. August, vol. 3. 2007. Accessed July 15, 2014, from 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr1 
58 Newbill III, Raymond R. Intelligence Sharing, Fusion Centers, And Homeland Security. No. 
AFIT/ICW/ENG/08-08. AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH SCHOOL OF 
ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT, 2008. 
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(2004), and the National Strategy for Information Sharing (2007) among other 
legislation, executive orders, and directives enacted after September 11th.59 
Road to 9/11 Commission Act and Creation of the Fusion Center Initiative 
 Prior to the enactment of the 9/11 Commission Act in 2007, other major 
legislation laid the foundation for the establishment of the Fusion Center initiative under 
DHS.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned DHS with the responsibility of 
organizing and sharing information between Federal, State, and Local government 
agencies.60 Further, in 2004 Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) that required the President to create the Information 
Sharing Environment for the purpose of sharing terrorism related information.61  Finally, 
in 2007 Congress passed the 9/11 Commission Act codifying the establishment of the 
Fusion Center Initiative and DHS as the lead with support from the Department of Justice 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
9/11 Commission Act Role in Codifying the Fusion Centers Initiative  
 The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, section 521, signed into law by the President 
of the United States in August of 2007, directed the Secretary of Homeland Security, with 
consultation from the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-
ISE), Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), Chief Privacy Officer (PRIV), 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), to establish the State, Local, and 
Regional Fusion Center initiative.62  The Fusion Center initiative, as set forth in 2007 by 
59 Bush, George W. "National strategy for information sharing." (2007). 
60Department Of Homeland Security, Interaction With State And Local Fusion Centers: Concept Of 
Operations; December 2008 http://fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/conops.pdf, pp44 accessed July 13 2014 
61 United States Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
458, 118 Stat 3638 at 3665 
62  United States Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment (2008), p4. 
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the 9/11 Commission Act, was designed to increase the flow of information “in two 
directions, between State, Local and Region Fusion Centers and the Department of 
Homeland Security.”63  The 9/11 Commission Act continues to define what a Fusion 
Center consists of, and what their responsibilities are. Further, the act defines the roles 
and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security’s Intelligence Officers 
assigned to Fusion Center.      
What constitutes a Fusion Center and what are their primary functions? 
 Fusion Centers are, as defined by the 9/11 Commission Act, “a collaborative 
effort of 2 or more Federal, State, Local, or tribal government agencies to detect, prevent, 
investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.”64,65 In order to 
support information sharing between multiple levels of government and several agencies, 
the act defines specific actions the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should 
support.  These actions include facilitating communication and coordination between 
SLFCs, providing operational and intelligence advice, serving as the point for 
disseminating homeland security information, and providing training and exercises to 
encourage information sharing.66  The Act also directs the DHS to review information at 
the State and Local level relating to homeland security and incorporate said information 
into the Departments information analysis.  The Fusion Center Initiative was designed to 
leverage both the Federal government’s analytical resources, and the state and local 
government’s wide array of information pertinent to homeland security. 
63 United States Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment (2008), p4 
64 US Congress, 9/11 Commission Act, August 3 2007. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/6/124h 
65 United States Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment (2008), p4 
66 United States Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment (2008), p5 
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 Countering terrorism is not the sole mission of fusion centers despite it being their 
founding principal objective.  Fusion Centers are often referred to as all-crime centers, or 
all-hazard focused centers.  With every fusion center having been independently 
designed, and primarily run by the States, they often utilize these centers to facilitate 
intelligence led policing, and crisis-emergency response.  Different State Fusion Centers 
have slightly different areas of focus.  For example, a Fusion Center near the Southwest 
border may focus on drug smuggling, gangs, and illegal immigration where a Fusion 
Center in New York City will focus on counterterrorism, among other activities. 
The proliferation of Fusion Centers can be attributed to the post 9/11 era policies 
that placed an emphasis on sharing information in support of national security and 
counterterrorism, although several State Fusion Centers existed before 9/11.  Currently 
there are 78 Fusion Centers within the United States majority of which operated by State 
Governments, although local governments operate select fusion centers often in major 
urban areas.67 States that had intelligence driven law enforcement organization prior to 
9/11 were primarily focused on activities related to gangs, drugs, and white-collar crimes, 
not terrorism.68  For states that had intelligence centers prior to 9/11, today’s fusion 
centers are an extension of those operations.  Today’s Fusion Centers are more 
interconnected with Federal departments, such as the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Fusion Centers are no longer isolated 
focusing only on activities within their State and more aware of issues in surrounding 
jurisdictions often helping where they can, according to former Fusion Center Director 
67 US Department of Homeland Security; Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information; available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information 
68 Eack, Kevin D. "State and Local Fusion Centers: Emerging Trends and Issues." Homeland Security 
Affairs. 2. (2008). www.hsaj.org (accessed November 2, 2011). 
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Ron Brooks.   Most Fusion Centers’ mission space has expanded to include counter 
terrorism and work together with other centers to exchange information. 
Definition of Intel Analysts at Fusion Center 
 DHS Intelligence Officers (IOs) assigned to State and Local Fusion Centers serve 
as the main conduit for communication between the Federal government, and State and 
Local government’s for threat information.  The IOs are responsible for reviewing State 
and Local information that is relevant to homeland security and fusing that information 
with federal intelligence to create a more complete threat picture for all consumers.  By 
fusing that information, the IOs are responsible for creating and disseminating 
intelligence threat products derived from State, Local, and Federal sources and passing 
that complete threat picture to stake holders at the Federal, State and Local level of 
government providing a unique prospective using unique information not available at the 
Federal level.69  This two-way relationship was designed as a mutually beneficial 
relationship for Federal, State, and Local governments. 
Advocates for civil liberties and privacy have been opposed to Fusion Centers 
pro-actively gathering intelligence and sharing information across large swathes of the 
government; despite most fusion centers claiming they do not actively collect intelligence 
or investigate crimes.70  Fusion centers are intended to act primarily as analytical and 
collaborative components for intelligence gathered by Federal agencies such as CIA, FBI, 
or DHS, and law enforcement entities within their State.71   
Define Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights 
69 United States Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment (2008), p5 
70 Brooks, Ron, Interview by Jonathan Kelly, July 19th 2014 
71 Only one Fusion Center is known to actively participate in investigations within their jurisdiction and 
that is Arizona’s Fusion Center (Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center). 
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 For the purpose of the chapter and in order to define the scope of language being 
referred to in this chapter, the terms privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties will be 
defined using the DHS, DOJ, Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and Fusion Centers 
Privacy Policies this chapter analyzes.   
 Civil Liberties will be defined as an individuals fundamental “rights, such as 
freedom of speech, press, or religion; due process of law; and other limitations on the 
power of the government to restrain or dictate the actions of individuals. They are the 
freedoms that are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights—the first ten Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States. Civil liberties offer protection to individuals from 
improper government action and arbitrary governmental interference. Generally, the term 
“civil rights” involves positive (or affirmative) government action, while the term “civil 
liberties” involves restrictions on government.”72 
 Civil Rights will be defined as the states “role in ensuring that all citizens have 
equal protection under the law and equal opportunity to exercise the privileges of 
citizenship regardless of race, religion, gender, or other characteristics unrelated to the 
worth of the individual. Civil rights are, therefore, obligations imposed on government to 
promote equality. More specifically, they are the rights to personal liberty guaranteed to 
all United States citizens by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and by acts of 
Congress.”73   
72  New Jersey Regional Operation and Intelligence Center, Privacy Policy; Delaware Valley Intelligence 
Center, Privacy Policy; Department of Justice, Global Information Share Initiative “Privacy, Civil Rights, 
Civil Liberties Policy Templates for Justice Information Systems” 
73 New Jersey Regional Operation and Intelligence Center, Privacy Policy; Delaware Valley Intelligence 
Center, Privacy Policy; Department of Justice, Global Information Share Initiative “Privacy, Civil Rights, 
Civil Liberties Policy Templates for Justice Information Systems” 
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 Privacy will be defined as an “individuals’ interests in preventing the 
inappropriate collection, use, and release of personal information. Privacy interests 
include privacy of personal behavior, privacy of personal communications, and privacy 
of personal data. Other definitions of privacy include the capacity to be physically left 
alone (solitude); to be free from physical interference, threat, or unwanted touching 
(assault, battery); or to avoid being seen or overheard in particular contexts.”74 
Liberty Versus Security Literature 
 The appropriate balance between security and liberty has been debated amongst 
scholars and citizens for hundreds of years.  As far back as Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan, 
the debate between the two concepts has been a fundamental question in all-free 
societies.75  The contemporary debate on liberty and security in the United States can 
roughly be categorized to three schools of thought.  The first is, by disposition, highly 
sympathetic to the national security policy and legislation that was implemented in 
response to 9/11 and views these measures to be within the United States constitutional 
limits and values and proportional to the threat.  The second school of thought is more 
libertarian in nature and believes that the Government is infringing on citizens’ rights by 
implementing unconstitutional national security policy. Lastly, some believe a more 
pragmatic approach is necessary and the government needs to balance both civil liberties 
and national security based on the threat environment.  This approach is known as the 
‘pragmatic authoritarian libertarian’ approach.  This balance needs to be carefully struck 
74 New Jersey Regional Operation and Intelligence Center, Privacy Policy; Delaware Valley Intelligence 
Center, Privacy Policy; Department of Justice, Global Information Share Initiative “Privacy, Civil Rights, 
Civil Liberties Policy Templates for Justice Information Systems” 
75 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, or the matter, forme and power of a commonwealth ecclesiasticall and civil. 
Yale University Press, 1928. 
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and frequently checked to ensure that any threats to personal liberties are proportional to 
the threats against security. 
  Open discussion on the appropriate balance between national security and 
freedom is an important check on government’s ability to overstep its authorities as this 
country witnessed between 1956 and 1971 during the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), Counter intelligence program (COINTELPRO).76  The 1950’s and 60’s were a 
time of unrest and civil disobedience in the United States.  During this period our 
Country was involved in an unpopular war in Vietnam, and battling issues with race at 
home. Concurrently, the FBI introduced its COINTELPRO, which they used and abused 
their authority to monitor and investigate citizens who were exercising their first 
amendment right to free speech. These citizens, who were within their right to exercise 
non-violent dissent of the US government’s activities, were scrutinized and often 
inappropriately monitored or arrested when their views did not align with or critical of 
the government.  COINTELPRO is just one example in our government’s history when 
they have inappropriately used their authority in the name of protecting liberty. 
Introduction to Fusion Center Literature review 
 Fusion Centers were developed, not without debate, in response to the 9/11 
Commission that identified the terrorist attacks on September 11th were in part successful 
because of the failure to share information.  Since the conception of Fusion Center, critics 
have argued they a form of domestic intelligence that restricts, or has the potential to 
restrict citizens’ civil rights, liberties, and privacy.  Alternatively, others have supported 
the development of Fusion Centers and their increased sharing of information amongst 
76  United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Records: The Vault: 
COINTELPRO”, accessed July 19 2014, http://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro 
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Federal, State, Local, and sometime private sectors in the name of securing our nation.  
The discussion of the proper role of Fusion Centers and domestic intelligence is a 
microcosm of the larger debate between national security and liberty this nation has 
discussed since it’s founding. 
 The Center for Strategic & International Study (CSIS), a bi-partisan think tank, 
has been supportive of DHS Fusion Centers and the value they add by bringing together 
counterterrorism and homeland security entities at the state and local level, because they 
are the entities most likely to encounter suspicious activities and potential indicators of 
threat activity.77  Further, they have commended DHS for the transparency Fusions 
Centers have provided, especially when dealing with information related to US citizens.78  
Although, CSIS warned DHS and Fusion Centers they must be cautious the controversy 
and scrutiny they face from civil liberties advocates and that it does not hinder their 
increased utility in sharing homeland security information.79  The issues of scrutiny was 
also identified by Ron Brooks, who stated Fusion Centers, and law enforcement operate 
on public trust and if they do not uphold that trust it will undermine their mission’s 
success.80 
 Others also assert that Fusion Centers are a success resulting in enhanced 
counterterrorism analysis and increased information sharing. The case in favor of 
enhancing information sharing between Federal, State, and Local agencies occurred on 
September 9th 2001 when a Maryland State Trooper stopped Ziad S Jarrah for speeding. 
Jarrah was one of the hijackers on September 11th 2001 and had the Maryland State 
77 Nelson, Rick and Wise Rob “Homeland Security at a Crossroads: Evolving DHS to Meet the Next 
Generation of Threats”. Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 1 2013.  
78 Nelson, Rick and Wise Rob “Homeland Security at a Crossroads”, 7, 10. 
79 Nelson, Rick and Wise Rob “Homeland Security at a Crossroads”, 7, 10. 
80 Brooks, Ron, Interview by Jonathan Kelly, July 19th 2014 
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Trooper had access to the information sharing environment in place today, he would have 
known Jarrah was on a CIA watchlist, and associated with terrorism, thus possibly 
disrupting the terrorist attacks on September 11th.81  The 9/11 Commission cited the 
September 11th attackers were able to exploit the gap between foreign intelligence, 
federal and local law enforcement capabilities in addition to legal restrictions sharing 
intelligence information with law enforcement in order to successful conduct the attacks, 
among other cited dysfunction.  Fusion centers were designed to bridge the gap between 
intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies, principally DHS, FBI, and CIA, and 
State and local law enforcement.82 
 Fusion Center advocates claim they play a critical role by providing unique 
information, only available to local and state entities, to be used to produce intelligence 
products that provide an enhanced threat picture.  By bridging the gap between Federal, 
State, and local information collected from a broad array of sources including law 
enforcement, public health and safety, and private sector, it allows the intelligence 
community to better understand the threat environment.  This enhanced ability to analyze 
data translates into better decisions by policy makers and more actionable intelligence for 
law enforcement.83 Law enforcement officers know their communities intimately and are 
the best eyes and ears to identify anomalies.  Their ability, combined with the national 
security community’s ability to identify larger trends and threats, has been combined to 
prevent adversaries from falling between the cracks of local law enforcement, and federal 
81 Rollins, John, and Tim Connors. State fusion center processes and procedures: Best practices and 
recommendations. Manhattan Institute, 2007. 
82 Rollins, John. "Fusion centers: Issues and options for Congress." Library of Congress Washington Dc 
Congressional Research Service, 2008. 5 
83 Rollins, John. "Fusion centers: Issues and options for Congress." Library of Congress Washington Dc 
Congressional Research Service, 2008. 6, 87. 
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intelligence and law enforcement.  Fusion centers were principally designed to fill the 
void, and breakdown the barriers that were preventing information sharing and disabling 
all parties involved to accurately understand the current threat environment.   
 Throughout several conversations with fusion center personnel, they have 
expressed FCs’ astute awareness to the hyper scrutiny their centers face when it comes to 
interacting with us personal information.84  Several FC personnel have noted that they a 
keenly aware that their centers existence and success rests on the publics perception and 
understanding that the FC and the government are not abusing their powers or infringing 
on their freedoms.85 
 Torin Monahan has been a prolific writer and critic of Fusion Centers’ mission, 
scope, and impact on citizens’ civil liberties, civil rights, and privacy. Monahan cites 
Fusion Centers mission creep from counterterrorism to a self-declared all crimes, all 
hazards focus as a significant threat to citizens.  Too little activity related to terrorism, a 
need to show “value added” in areas of responsibility, and pressure to use resources 
available to Fusion Centers have been three factors driving the shift in focus from 
counterterrorism to all crimes, all hazards.86   
 Monahan and Regan further describe the function of Fusion Centers as not all-
knowing entities but centers that bring together personnel and information from a wide 
array of agencies, both federal and local, that enables law enforcement or intelligence 
agencies to query each other for relevant information without full visibility to where the 
84 Brooks, Ron, Interview by Jonathan Kelly, July 19th 2014 
85 Rollins, John. "Fusion centers: Issues and options for Congress." Library of Congress Washington Dc 
Congressional Research Service, 2008. 5 
Brooks, Ron, Interview by Jonathan Kelly, July 19th 2014. 
86 Regan, Priscilla M., and Torin Monahan. "Beyond Counterterrorism: Data Sharing, Privacy, and 
Organizational Histories of DHS Fusion Centers."International Journal of E-Politics (IJEP) 4, no. 3 
(2013): 1-14. 
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information is going or how it will be used.87  The issue Monahan and Regan foresees 
with organizations that blend data from such a wide variety of sources and provides that 
information to a variety of customers is data sharing may become ambiguous and 
violations or infringements may be difficult to document because of how the information 
is being shared.88  The way Fusion Centers share information creates, what Monahan and 
Regan coins, “zones of opacity” by eluding public records requests under national 
security exemptions, not recording database searches, or who the information customers 
are.89 
 Concerns that Fusion Centers will impede on citizens’ civil liberties, civil rights, 
and privacy are not unsubstantiated according to Monahan who cites several examples of 
Fusion Centers engaging in activities that constitute racial profiling, political profiling, 
illegal data mining, and illegal data collection.90  Monahan and the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) cite an example of a threat report produced by a Fusion Center 
targeting university students at a historically black university as a possible group that 
may engage in race based extremism based on the State’s historical precedence dating 
back to the civil war.  The ACLU claimed such an assessment based on the evidence 
provided was clearly a case of racial profiling.91 
 Another example cited by Monahan was a Fusion Center’s involvement in the 
covert infiltration into numerous nonviolent peace activist groups that were brought to 
87 Monahan, Torin, and Priscilla M. Regan. "Zones of opacity: Data fusion in post-9/11 security 
organizations." Canadian Journal of Law and Society 27, no. 3 (2012): 301-317. 
88  Monahan, Torin, and Priscilla M. Regan. "Zones of opacity” 316. 
89 Monahan, Torin, and Priscilla M. Regan. "Zones of opacity” 316. 
90 Monahan, Torin. "The future of security? Surveillance operations at homeland security fusion 
centers." Social Justice (2010): 88. 
91 Monahan, Torin. "The future of security?” 88. 
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public light after an ACLU freedom of information act request.92  The investigations into 
the groups continued despite the undercover agent reporting that threats of violent 
activity were not evident.  Further, the activities were labeled as “primary crime” and 
“terrorism anti-government” by law enforcement as justification for the activity, although 
Monahan asserts the activities were not.  Activities by law enforcement and FCs that 
target individuals based on political affiliation, if continued, could have chilling effect on 
citizens’ freedom of speech, association, and religion, according to Monahan.93 
 The ACLU is a prolific watchdog of Fusion Centers, and critical of their 
activities, claiming that they operate with little to no oversight while infringing on 
citizens’ rights.94  The ACLU claims, citing a Senate Intelligence Committee report on 
Fusion Centers95, that DHS personnel author intelligence reports that routinely infringing 
on citizens’ civil liberties and civil rights, Fusions Centers withheld information from 
congressional oversight committees, and DHS conducted no meaningful oversight of 
Fusion Centers or their activities.96  The DHS provides civil liberties, civil rights, and 
privacy training to all Fusion Center personnel, although the ACLU claims the several 
hours of training provided to these intelligence and law enforcement personnel is not 
enough to teach all the nuisances of the law.97  The ACLU again alleged that Fusion 
Centers were trampling citizens’ rights through DHS’s suspicious activity reporting 
initiative that allows the collection and retention of citizens’ information based on often-
92 Monahan, Torin. "The future of security?” 88. 
93 Monahan, Torin. "The future of security?” 89. 
94 Dansky, Kara. “Senate Homeland Security Committee Misses the Mark with Statement on DHS “Fusion 
Center” Program” 10 October 2012.  Available at: https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-
criminal-law-reform-national-security-free-speech/senate-homeland 
95 Senate, U. S. "Federal support for and involvement in state and local fusion centers." (2012). 
96 Dansky, Kara. “Senate Homeland Security” 10 October 2012.   
97 Dansky, Kara. “Senate Homeland Security” 10 October 2012.   
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groundless information.98  Further, the ACLU obtained documents through a freedom of 
information act request that shows Fusion Centers themselves have often questioned the 
suspicious activity-reporting (SAR) initiatives’ privacy policy, retention of data, and lack 
of guidance on how the system works.99 Recently, as of July 10th 2014, the ACLU 
represented five plaintiffs who have sued Eric Holder, the Attorney General, and the 
Department of Justice seeking a “permanent injunction” on the SAR program.100 
 The ACLU has been extremely critical of the Federal government’s SAR 
initiative that engages state and local law enforcement, private sector, and private citizens 
to submit suspicious activities reports for review and inclusion in an anti-terrorism 
database.101  The ACLU has warned that such an initiative would lead to violations of 
privacy, racial and religious profiling, and interference with constitutionally protected 
activities.102  Further, the ACLU has issues with the scope of the suspicious activity 
reporting initiative because the DHS and FBI has encouraged any and all reporting that 
may be potentially be related to terrorism.  The ACLU has warned that many of these 
“potentially terrorism related activities” may encompass activities that are lawful and 
protected under the first amendment. 
Protective Measures for Civil Liberties Civil Rights and Privacy 
98 Choudhury, Nusrat. Where's the Suspicion in Government's "Suspicious Activity" Reports?”. 13 October 
2013. https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/wheres-suspicion-governments-
suspicious-activity 
99 Choudhury, Nusrat. Where's the Suspicion in Government's "Suspicious Activity" Reports?”. 13 October 
2013. 
100 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/10/civil-liberties-groups-lawsuit-suspicious-activity-
database, accessed July 12, 2014 
101 Mass, Julia Haurumi, & German, Michael. “The Government is Spying on You: ACLU Releases New 
Evidence of Overly Broad Surveillance of Everyday Activities”. ACLU. 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/government-spying-you-aclu- releases-
new-evidence 
102 Mass, Julia Haurumi, & German, Michael. “The Government is Spying on You”. 
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 The DHS has put in place several safeguards to protect citizens’ civil liberties, 
civil rights, and privacy from the potential impact the State and Local Fusion Center 
Program may pose. As of March 2013 the DHS, Office for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties has published an Impact Assessment examining SLFCP’s effect on citizens’ 
rights.103  The DHS in 2008 also released a Privacy Impact Assessment examining the 
impact the Fusion Center Initiative has on citizens’ privacy.104  Additionally, individual 
State and Local Fusion Centers have released privacy policies outlining their handling of 
potential sensitive information and the centers activities that may infringe on citizens 
privacy such as social media collection.105  This section will take an in depth look at the 
programs in place to protect citizens’ civil liberties, civil rights, and privacy and if they 
are adequately protect citizens’ rights.  Currently the DHS, Office of CRCL is training, 
advising, guiding, and providing technical assistance to Fusions Centers in order to 
implement measures that safeguard CRCLP. 
DHS Guidance  
 In 2006 DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) published Fusion Center 
Guidelines, which advised State and Local Fusion Centers to write, publish, and adhere to 
privacy and civil liberties policies.106  Further, in 2008 DHS published Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers that outlined three 
additional layers of protection.  DHS recommended within these publications Fusion 
103 US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. “Civil Rights/Civil 
Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion  Centers”, 2013 
104 United States Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment (2008), p5 
105  New Jersey, New Jersey State Police, Regional Operation and Intelligence Center. 
Philadelphia Police Department, Delaware Valley Intelligence Center. 
106 US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. “Civil Rights/Civil 
Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion  Centers”, 2013, 22 
Intelligence, Law Enforcement. "Fusion Center Guidelines." Department of Justice-Bureau of Justice 
Assistance. Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (2006). 
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Centers appoint a privacy official, develop a comprehensive privacy policy, conduct 
outreach, training related to privacy, and develop a mechanism for auditing to ensure 
adherence to these policies.107  It appears as of the 2012 National Network of Fusion 
Center Assessment all but one FC has appointed a Privacy Officer and as of the 2013 
CRCL Impact Assessment DHS CRCL has trained 68 Officers of the 78 DHS recognized 
FCs.108 The DOJ and DHS subsequently released a “Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties Compliance Verification for the Intelligence Enterprise” tool for verifying 
policies were in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.109  This guide provides 
essentially a checklist that allows FCs to assess whether their CRCLP policies are fully 
developed and implemented within their centers.110 
DHS Training 
 Beyond providing guidance and templates for PCRCL policies, DHS has also 
provided training and education to Federal, State and Local officials and executives.  This 
training includes the Naval Postgraduate School’s, Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security course that discusses the necessity of protecting citizens’ civil liberties, civil 
rights, and privacy.  An ACLU policy analyst has previously led discussion within this 
course and the ACLU’s white paper critique of Fusion Centers is required regarding for 
all participants.111  DHS, CRCL, Privacy and I&A have also provided an extensive 
107 US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. “Civil Rights/Civil 
Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion  Centers”, 2013, 23 
108 “2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report”, June 2013, 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final 
Report.pdf, Assessed July 13 2014. 
109 US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. “Civil Rights/Civil 
Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion  Centers”, 2013, 23 
110 DHS, DOJ, “Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties 
Compliance Verification for the Intelligence Enterprise”, June 2010. 
111 US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. “Civil Rights/Civil 
Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion  Centers”, 2013, 23 
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training program for analysts at Fusion Centers.  As of the close of fiscal year 2012 DHS 
has provided privacy and CRCL training to 50 Fusion Centers.112  DHS estimates to have 
trained 1,309 fusion center staffers in addition to 754 liaison officers, and other 
employees at Fusion Centers on the importance on requirements of protecting citizens 
CRCLPs.113 In an effort to customize training to the diverse roles every fusion center 
plays DHS has developed nine classes to offer Fusion Centers and their personnel.114,115   
 The Office of CRCL and Office of Privacy continually conducts two classes for 
intelligence analysts deploying to Fusion Centers, “Privacy Fundamentals for Fusion 
Center professionals” and “CRCL Fundamentals for Fusion Center Professions”.116 The 
former outlines information sharing authorities and parameters, how to report incidents, 
and intelligence reporting and privacy.  The latter teaches trainees how to spot red flags, 
what first amendment activities are protected, and how to recognize potential civil 
liberties or civil rights issues.117  The DHS has also implemented a "Training the 
Trainers” program in order to train privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights Officials 
located onsite at FCs.118 As of 2013, DHS had trained Privacy/Civil Liberties Officers 
from 68 of the 78 recognized Fusion Centers.  Beyond training on site Officers, and 
112 US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. “Civil Rights/Civil 
Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion  Centers”, 2013, 22 
113  US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. “Civil Rights/Civil 
Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion  Centers”, 2013, 236 
114 US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. “Civil Rights/Civil 
Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion  Centers”, 2013, 36 
115 Classes include: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Basics: Red Flags; Privacy Fundamentals; Cultural 
Tactics for Intelligence and Law Enforcement Professionals; First Amendment Issues for the ISE; Privacy, 
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Basic Concepts; Intelligence Analysts: Product Review Exercise; 
Transparency and Public Trust: Reach Out to the Community; 28 C.F.R. Part 23; Fusion Center- Specific 
Issues & Perspectives. 
116 US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. “Civil Rights/Civil 
Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion  Centers”, 2013, 35 
117  US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. “Civil Rights/Civil 
Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion  Centers”, 2013, 35 
118  US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. “Civil Rights/Civil 
Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion  Centers”, 2013, 37 
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conducting on site training, the Office for CRCL also has an online portal for FC 
personnel to conduct training through, and has offered customized coursed to meet the 
unique needs of individual FCs. 
Oversight and Review of Programs and Products 
 DHS has several layers of review that products and programs written by DHS 
deployed analysts must go through, before they can be disseminated or programs can be 
implemented.  Within DHS the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Office of 
Privacy, Officer of General Counsel, and I&A leadership all must all coordinate and 
review products and programs to ensure all CRCLP concerns are addressed before 
disseminating a product or implementing of a program.  This four-layer review process 
ensures that all equities are represented and protected within a product.  The Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis, which DHS deployed IOs are a part of, produces 
approximately 1000 products a year and every one goes through this review process to 
ensure protection of citizens’ rights.119  This review process is only mandatory for DHS 
deployed personnel, because Fusion Centers are state and locally operated, DHS does not 
have the authority to mandate Fusion Center products go through DHS’s review 
process.120 
 Fusion Centers that do not have a formal review and coordination process in place 
should implement a program that ensures protection and objective representation of civil 
rights, civil liberties, and privacy.  Incorporating a review process that objectively 
analyzes products and programs could ensure that FCs do not infringe on citizens’ rights-
119 United States, Government Accountability Office, “DHS Intelligence Analysis: Additional Actions 
Needed to Address Analytic Priorities and Workforce Challenge”, Jun 4, 2014, GAO-14-397 accessed at: 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-397 
120 US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. “Civil Rights/Civil 
Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion Centers”, 2013, 36 
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whether civil, constitutional, or statutory rights.  Further, the review process would help 
balance the interest of law enforcement and intelligence officials, with the interests of 
private citizens. 
Implementing Formal Community Outreach Programs for Fusion Centers 
 According to the DHS Fusion Center Assessments, in the 2011 only 17 Fusion 
Centers had formalized community outreach programs, and 33 Fusion Centers had 
outreach programs in 2012.121,122 Although the Fusion Center Assessment identified an 
increase in formalized outreach programs between 2011 and 2012, DHS should increase 
pressure on States to create formal outreach programs within the communities in which 
they reside.  Outreach programs would be a great way for fusion centers to communicate 
their mission and focus to the public.  Also, it would enlist communities’ assistance to 
inform law enforcement and Fusion Centers when the public identifies suspicious activity 
that may be of interest to law enforcement.  DHS has initiated the “ If You See 
Something, Say Something” initiative that encourages the reporting of suspicious 
activities.  Further, the DHS and FBI have the suspicious activity reporting programs for 
reporting unusual or suspicious activity.  Community outreach programs would assist 
Fusion Centers in a multifaceted way that would further their goal and educate the 
community. 
Analysis, Evaluation, and Recommendations 
Outreach and Community Engagement 
121 “2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report”, June 2013, p23 
“2011 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report”, May 2012, p22 
122 The Fusion Center Assessments were a result of The Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2010 
recommending DHS implement a process that better enables them to measure performance objectives of 
Fusion Center.122 
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 DHS CRCL, PRIV and officials at State and Local FCs need to continue outreach 
and community engagement in order to educate their customers, the public, and private 
industry on what they do, the safeguards in place, and the utility in reporting information 
to them.  According to the 2008 PIA, the Office of Privacy has engaged the public 
through meetings that enhance the public’s understanding of what Fusion Centers are 
designed to do, but these examples are antidotal and not programmatic in nature.123  
DHS, The Office of Privacy and FCs have to better engage the public and the 
communities they serve to better educate their communities and build trust.   
 Mentioned in the previous chapter of this thesis portfolio, the Office for CRCL 
has engaged the public and addressed issues encompassed in this chapter related to 
freedoms, privacy, civil liberties and civil rights, although more inclusive public 
engagements could be conducted to enhance the visibility of these engagements.  
Furthermore, the community roundtable discussions hosted by CRCL do not directly 
address the issues and concerns of Fusion Centers.  
 State and Local Fusion Centers have conducted outreach and discussions with 
local communities on an ad hoc basis, according to a discussion with Ron Brooks-former 
director of the Northern California Region Intelligence Center.124  Although, additional 
formalized outreach could be initiated in order to cement open lines of communication.  
Fusion Centers have brought in critics of their program, such as the ACLU and 
communities, to discuss areas of concern and ways to remedy those issues.125  
Additionally, according to State and Local law enforcement and Fusion Centers they are 
123 United States Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment (2008), p.ii 
124 Brooks, Ron, Former Fusion Center Director of Northern California Regional Intelligence Center. 
Interview by Jonathan Kelly, July 19th 2014. July 19, 2014 
125 Brooks, Ron, Interview by Jonathan Kelly, July 19th 2014. 
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cognizant of the necessity in communicating openly with local communities in order to 
build trust.  FCs understand their ultimate success depends on the trust of their 
community, as shown in interviews the Congressional Research Service conducted with 
FC personnel and conversations with former Fusion Center Director Ron Brooks.   
 This chapter recommends better public outreach and engagement, although that 
does not need to occur exclusively through roundtables or meetings.  More publicly 
available information, that is easier to access through organization’s website or social 
media could act as a venue to inform the public about current events.  There are various 
vectors and venues all entities involved in the State and Local Fusion Center program 
could use to better communicate with the public.  Some Fusion Centers have robust 
engagement efforts and publicly available information; while other Fusion Centers do 
not, and this is likely a result of centers various governing entities. 
Limited Evidence Suggesting Over Reach 
 Limited evidence has been discovered to indicate civil liberties, civil rights, or 
privacy have continuously, systematically, or negligently been abused or laws broken.  
DHS Office for CRCL has received only two formal complaints as of the publishing of 
the CRCL Impact Assessment in March 2013. This limited evidence could be a result of 
not having established avenues for redress, or evidence that there is no actual issue. This 
chapter supports the CRCL Impact Assessments recommendation to DHS that they 
increase the avenues of redress for the public who may be impact by Fusion Center 
activities.   
 The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs released 
a report in 2012 that was extremely critical of Fusion Centers’ effectiveness to generate 
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useful and legal intelligence. Although the Senate Report cites several examples where 
reporting could have over stepped bounds, oversight authorities, including DHS CRCL, 
and senior reviewers who identified issues within reports and prevented them from being 
disseminated.  The Senate Report cited intelligence reports written, that if published, 
could have violated privacy rights, and civil liberties of US citizens.  The Senate Report 
continues to provide several examples where information included in intelligence 
reporting derived from State and Local Fusion Centers were not appropriately collected 
and violated citizens civil liberties.126  The collection and drafting of potentially illegal 
intelligence reports is cause for concern, and likely an issue of poor training as identified 
by both DHS CRCL and the Senate Report, although the identification of problematic 
reports by supervisors is, at minimum, a sign of a functioning review process because it 
resulted in the cancellation of potentially violating reports. 
Privacy Policy Template Used by State and Local Fusion Centers 
 In 2013 all but one Fusion Center had written a Privacy Policy in accordance with 
the guidance provided by DHS and DOJ.  The privacy policies are commendable for 
informing the public of FCs commitment to protecting CRCLP.  Although, most of the 
privacy policies reviewed when gathering sources for this chapter followed a very similar 
template and included similar, if not identical language.127   The boilerplate and vague 
language used by Fusion Centers when writing and publishing their privacy policies 
undermines the legitimacy of the policy.  Further, the privacy policies often fail to 
identify what legal oversight processes are in place for the FC.  In comparison, DHS has 
126 United States Senate, "Federal support for and involvement in state and local fusion centers." (2012). 23 
127 Privacy Policies published by the Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (DVIC), New Jersey Regional 
Operations and Intelligence Center (NJROIC), Delaware Information and Analysis Center (DIAC), 
California State Threat Assessment Center (CSTAC) were reviewed when composing this research. 
 61 
                                                        
a very thorough review process for all products and programs, as outlined above, but 
SLFC privacy policies’ do not identify who has primary legal oversight.  Since most FCs 
are run by State and/or Local police it is assumed that there Office of General Counsel or 
Attorney Generals Office preform legal oversight.  This chapter suggests that State and 
Local Fusion Centers more clearly define what legal oversight they have and avenues 
citizens have for redress.   
Oversight Boards and Privacy Officers 
 Privacy policies published by FCs identify privacy committees and the privacy 
officers as the main representatives advocating for and overseeing CRCLP issues within 
the fusion centers.  The 2012 National Fusion Center Assessment reported that “only 
27.3% of fusion centers (21) reported that their P/CRCL Officer was experienced in 
P/CRCL issues before being assigned to the position within the fusion center, and 87% of 
fusion centers (67) reported that their P/CRCL Officer has additional duties beyond 
P/CRCL protections that account for the majority of his time.”128  The lack of a dedicated 
Privacy Officer is potentially an issue because they may lack full investment in 
representing all CRCLP equities when reviewing products and programs.  Further, if they 
are severing in a dual capacity they may have vested interested in the success of the 
product or program and not objectively review the product/program.  
Areas for Additional Research 
 This chapter was written to fully analyze the body of literature critically 
evaluating the national Fusion Center initiative that encompasses federal, state, and local 
agencies while fusing the capabilities of law enforcement and intelligence organizations.  
Further questions and research could be conducted to examine operational redlines of 
128 “2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report”, June 2013, p23 
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fusion centers. Ron Brooks and other fusion center personnel cite the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) 28, Part 23 as the main governing law that guides what they are 
operational capable of perusing and including within their holdings.129  CFR 28, states 
that information can be maintained in criminal intelligence databases if it “reasonable 
suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal conduct or activity and the 
information is relevant to that criminal conduct or activity.”130  Additional research 
should analyze if this standard is adequate for protecting citizens’ CRCLP and if agencies 
properly maintain this standard throughout their operations. 
Conclusion  
Compliance with 9/11 Commission Act and Applicable Laws 
 Ensuring “that the civil rights and civil liberties of persons are not diminished by 
efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland” is one of DHS’s 
primary missions designated by law within the Homeland Security Act.131  Additionally, 
the 9/11 Commission Act directs the DHS to establish the State and Local Fusion Center 
Program for sharing information between Federal, State, and Local governments.  The 
combination of these two statutes entrusts DHS to establish the State and Local Fusion 
Center program while also ensuring civil rights and civil liberties of persons are not 
diminished.  Through the implementation of the various programs, oversight processes, 
training programs, and other programs outlined in this chapter, DHS is fulfilling their 
mandatory responsibility to protect citizens civil rights and civil liberties, although 
continued improvement are needed to ensure continued protection. 
129 Brooks, Ron, Interview by Jonathan Kelly, July 19th 2014. 
130 United States, Department of Justice, Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 28, Part 23. Criminal 
Intelligence Systems Operating Policies 
131 US Congress, Homeland Security Act of 2002, November 25 2002 
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Influencing Change Within Fusion Centers 
 The DHS can only guide and influence how State and Local Fusion Centers 
operate.  DHS is not the executive agency for any Fusion Center therefore they lack the 
authority to mandate Fusion Centers operate in a specific way.  Their primary role is to 
ensure the proper sharing of information, and coordination amongst Fusion Centers and 
the Federal government. DHS does have substantial influence on how State and Local 
Fusion Centers operate but they don’t control their budget, policies or daily operations.  
The DHS can only directly influence and control how DHS personnel deployed to Fusion 
Centers operate and what information they share. DHS in consolation with the Network 
of National Fusion Centers can influence and shape policies within Fusion Centers. 
Restricting Federal Grant Money to Influence Change 
 DHS can strongly influence how Fusion Centers operate by making federal policy 
mandatory within Fusion Centers as a condition of accepting federal grant money. During 
the establishment of the National Network of Fusion Centers, Fusion Centers received a 
substantial amount of federal grant money to assist in their establishment, although as 
Fusion Centers mature and federal spending for national security subsides Fusion Centers 
are becoming less dependent on grant money.  Nevertheless, DHS could influence and 
enforce CRCLP policy within Fusion Centers by making CRCLP protections a condition 
of grant money that is tied to equipment, and personnel. 
Impact of the Fusion Center Program on Citizen’s Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
 There is little evidence to suggest Fusion Centers have regularly, or negligently 
trampled on citizens’ privacy, civil rights, or civil liberties as accused by some scholars, 
advocates, and politicians.  The DHS with assistance from its components has instituted 
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measures that reinforce the importance of protecting citizens’ rights while also ensuring 
national security.  Further steps could be taken to cement policies within Fusion Centers 
that protect CRCLP, although DHS and State and Local Fusion Centers have systems in 
place that offer some protections.  The DHS State and Local Fusion Center Program 
continues to balance between national security and citizens’ right and this chapter 




















Research Question: Is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office for Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) fulfilling its mission and are their actions sufficient as 
defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and applicable regulations? 
   This chapter analyzes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office for 
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) to determine if they are protecting civil rights 
and civil liberties in accordance with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and regulations 
that guide their mission. The importance of this analysis and the review of these 
protections afforded to citizens’ civil rights and liberties was evident in 2004, when 
Daniel Sutherland, the DHS Officer for CRCL, spoke at the Heritage Foundation while 
reviewing the accomplishments and role of the Office for CRCL one year after its 
establishment. Daniel Sutherland and Michael Chertoff spoke again in 2008 at the 
Heritage Foundation to review the role of the Office for CRCL 5 years after DHS’s 
establishment. The Office had established itself, as a proactive means for protecting 
CRCL within the DHS and in this sense was a libertarian institution by design.  In 
keeping with this tradition of checks and reviews, this chapter is designed to be a 10-year 
review of the Office for CRCL. 
 Findings from this chapter suggest the Office for CRCL is protecting civil rights 
and civil liberties of citizens while also ensuring homeland security.  The Office for 
CRCL conducts training, oversight, and public outreach and is involved with many 
aspects of the homeland security enterprise to ensure that citizens’ are protected in DHS’s 
efforts to secure the nation.   After reviewing the functions and activities of the Office of 
CRCL, this chapter recommends three ways the Office for CRCL and the DHS could 
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increase transparency and protection of citizens.  The Office first needs to report metrics 
in support of their effort of reviewing department reports and policies.  Second, the 
Office needs to better advertise to the public when they are holding community 
engagement events.  Lastly, it is suggested evidence be presented that information 
obtained through community engagement events is influencing and being incorporated 
into changes within the department. 
Background 
      The liberty versus security debate traces as far back as Thomas Hobbes’ and is 
a fundamental question at the heart of liberal societies.132  Although, the contemporary 
debate on liberty and security in the United States can roughly be reduced to three 
schools of thought.  The first is, by disposition, highly sympathetic to the national 
security policy and legislation that was implemented in response to 9/11 and views these 
measures to be within the United States constitutional limits and values and proportional 
to the threat.  The second school of thought is more libertarian in nature and believes that 
the government is trampling on citizens’ rights by implementing unconstitutional national 
security policy.  While fighting the war on terrorism this school of thought alleges the 
government has trampled citizens’ rights by conducting unwarranted search and seizures, 
wiretaps, and violated habeas corpus, among other violations, all in the name of national 
security.  Lastly, some believe a more pragmatic approach is necessary and the 
government needs to balance both civil liberties and national security based on the threat 
environment.  This approach is known as the ‘pragmatic authoritarian libertarian’ 




                                                        
approach.  This balance needs to be carefully struck and frequently checked to ensure that 
any threats to personal liberties are proportional to the threats against security. 
Pro Government Counter Terrorism Policy 
 Select scholars have supported the United States’ counter terrorism policy that 
followed the September 11th attacks.  Among them, Jin C. Ting convincingly argues the 
steps the government has taken in response to 9/11 are within the United States 
constitution limits and values, and proportional to the threat.133 Supporters of post 9/11 
initiatives claim the government's response was necessary, justified, and legal.  The US 
Government has the responsibility to protect the constitution against enemies foreign and 
domestic, and their reaction was in fulfillment of their obligation.  Furthermore, John 
Yoo, who was Deputy Assistant Attorney General from 2001 to 2003 and helped form 
the legal justification for much of the post 9/11 counter terrorism policy, strongly 
supports this policy and cites its foundation in constitutional power.134 
 Those that support the US Government’s counterterrorism policies claim our 
current enemy is different than our enemies of the past and this new enemy requires 
different methods and policies in order to protect our homeland.  The terrorists who 
desire to cause harm to the United States will attempt to utilize our liberties within a free 
and open society to facilitate their actions.  The groups that are seeking to attack us do 
not wear uniforms or represent a country.  These groups are acting clandestinely on 
behalf of an idea and motivated by causing chaos and harm to our society.  
Opponents to Government Counter Terrorism Policy 
133 Tin, Jan C. "Unobjectionable But Insufficient--Federal Initiatives in Response to the September 11 
Terrorist Attacks." Conn. L. Rev. 34 (2001): 1145. 
134 Yoo, John. The powers of war and peace: The Constitution and foreign affairs after 9/11. University of 
Chicago Press, 2008. 
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Select scholars, media, and public commentators, have strongly opposed post 9/11 
counter terrorism policies while questioning the effect these policies have had on 
people’s civil liberties and civil rights.  Opponents question these policies effects on 
reducing habeas corpus rights, immigration rights, government transparency, free speech 
rights, right to a speedy and public trial, search and arrest warrants based on probable 
cause, and presumption of innocence, among others.135  Countering terrorism presents a 
unique issue that differs from other types crime because, by its nature, crimes need to be 
prevented before they occur and our judicial system is traditionally used in rendering 
damages after an event or action occurs.136  Furthermore, there is a paradox between 
trading liberty for security because with absolute security there is no freedom and with 
absolute freedom there is no security.137   
David Cole, among others, has argued in support of limited government intrusion 
on citizen’s civil liberties and civil right citing the 9/11 Commission Report.  He claims 
that the 9/11 attacks occurred not because the attackers abused the United States highly 
regarded civil rights and civil liberties and our free and open society, but because the 
paradigm of intelligence and law enforcement agencies resulted in the stove piping of 
information that prevented the system from working. 138 Further, he claims that the 9/11 
attacks were primarily planned over seas where the US Government has significantly 
fewer restrictions protecting civil rights and civil liberties.  David Cole’s argument 
135 Baker, Nancy V. "National security versus civil liberties." Presidential Studies Quarterly 33, no. 3 
(2003): 547-567. 
136 Baker, Nancy V. "National security versus civil liberties."  
137 Hobbes article 
138 David, Cole, and James X. Dempsey. Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing civil liberties in the 
name of national security. The New Press, 2006. 
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concludes that laws, rights, and liberties were not impeding the government from 
ensuring national and homeland security. 
 Title II of the Patriot Act, Enhanced Surveillance Procedures, vastly expanded the 
government’s ability to intercept communications and conduct searches using one 
warrant while blocking notification of the search to the person.139  Further, under Title II 
government agencies were now permitted to share information between law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies.  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was also expanded 
under Title II of the Patriot Act allowing for surveillance at the lower standard of a 
preponderance of evidence.140  Opponents to the newly expanded powers given to 
government agencies are uneasy about the limited oversight given to these new powers, 
which leave room for them to be abused.141  
 The Judicial branch has traditionally given preferential treatment to the Executive 
Branch during times of war.142  During past conflicts, such as World War II and the Civil 
War, the courts have given great latitude to the President.  World War II saw the creation 
of internment camps for Japanese immigrants who were seen as a threat to national 
security.  Also, during the Civil War President Lincoln suspended habeas corpus for 
those detained.143  Opponents to current policy argue that past actions are not sufficient 
justification for current infringement of rights.144  Past and present struggles for civil 
rights such as LGBT movements, women’s suffrage movements, and civil rights 
movements of the 50’s and 60’s should be a cautionary tale for using previous unjust 
139 Baker, 560 
140 Baker, 561 
141 Baker, 561 
142 Baker, 548 
143 Cole, David, and Dempsey, James X.. Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing civil liberties in t
 he name of national security. The New Press, 2006. Forward 
144 Cole & Dempsey. p 2 
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actions to support current policy.  History has shown even when policies are legally 
justified they are not always morally or ethically sound decisions.  Furthermore, the war 
against terrorism and Al Qaeda is a war that has no clear end.  It has also been argued that 
the tactic of terrorism has existed for hundreds of years and is likely to threaten free 
societies for the foreseeable future.145 
Balance of Civil Liberties and National Security 
 Among those who vehemently support the US Government’s counterterrorism 
policy and those who passionately dissent against it, there is a third school who 
acknowledge there is a civil liberties-national security continuum that must constantly be 
evaluated.146  It must be used with caution because both schools of thought use this 
argument of balance to justify their position.  It can be argued that civil liberties have 
been curtailed but only because the threat is so great.  Or, civil liberties need to be 
protected because the threat is not as grave as the government says it is.   John Yoo and 
others have used this argument in support of their position.147 Supreme Court Justice 
Robert Jackson expressed support for the position of balance when in 1949 during the 
dissenting opinion of Terminiello v. Chicago of a free speech case he said that the Bill of 
Rights should not be made into a suicide pact.148 149 This is to mean, at times when there 
is a great threat to national security, civil liberties will often need to be curtailed and 
when the nation feels relatively safe liberties will take precedent.  Richard Posner has 
outlined how the government and specifically the Judicial Branch have balanced civil 
liberties and national security at times of war and peace. There is an agreed upon need to 
145 Baker, 555 
146 Cole & Dempsey. p 2 
147 Yoo, 2008. 
148 Posner, Richard A. "Security versus civil liberties." The Atlantic Monthly 288 (2001): 46.  
149 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 1131 (1949). 
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balance the scales depending on the threat to the nation, but much of the debate occurs on 
how far the government can go in the name of national security.150  The US Government 
did have the foresight to include a sunset clause within the Patriot Act that shows that the 
Government acknowledges the need to balance civil liberties and national security in 
times of war and peace. 
 The prolific legal scholar Judge, Richard Posner, known for being a staunch 
libertarian in his writings, is a strong supporter of continually balancing civil liberties 
with the current national security threat environment.  This may come to a surprise to 
some libertarian purists, and to them, even appear to be a violation of his intellectual 
commitment to libertarianism.  But this position arises not from an abstract doctrinal 
commitment but from pragmatic considerations and has been coined the Pragmatic 
Authoritarian Libertarian.   Bernard E. Harcourt, in his article analyzing why Judge 
Posner deviates from his traditional libertarian position, looks at what he calls a 
Pragmatic Authoritarian Libertarian position.  He tries and explain why Judge Posner 
would take what is considered such a libertarian position in the Edmond v. City of 
Indianapolis, 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999) and then write in post 9/11 articles supporting 
government policy restricting civil liberties.151  The pragmatic approach as described by 
Harcourt and Posner is when public safety is threatened so greatly, such as in times of 
imminent threat or attacks like 9/11, normal restraints on law enforcement and 
150 Posner, R. A. (2006). Not a suicide pact: The Constitution in a time of national emergency (p. 9). New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
151 Harcourt, Bernard E., “Judge Richard Posner on Civil Liberties: Pragmatic Authoritarian Libertarian. 
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 74, 2007; University of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin 
Working Paper No. 331; University of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 152. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=965578 
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intelligence officials need to be loosened.152  Staunch libertarians would disagree with 
this position because they assert that when the government wants to curtail civil liberties 
and aggressively pursue security, this is when civil liberties and rights are needed most.  
Civil liberties are not as important in times when the government is not looking to abuse 
them.  With this being said, the pragmatic authoritarian libertarian position supports a 
real evaluation of the threat environment be conducted against the real effect these 
policies have on civil liberties.  What actions can be justified under this approach this 
year, month, or day may not be justified tomorrow.  Further, the question could be asked 
is the sacrifice of civil liberties and civil rights worth it, or is doing nothing to combat the 
threat worth it?  Does the possibility exist that doing nothing and sacrificing no freedom 
could result in a significant curtailment of freedom and security in the future?  If the 
answer is yes, then Pragmatic Authoritarian Libertarian would suggest taking action at 
this time and continually recalculate the threat to ensure a proper balance of civil rights 
and civil liberties and security.153  Much like its name, it is a pragmatic approach, 
evaluating and continually surveying and seeking to balance the security environment 
with civil liberties.  
The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties as a Pragmatic Authoritarian Libertarian 
 Of the three schools of thought, the Office for CRCL operates in line with the 
Pragmatic Authoritarian Libertarian position by balancing the need to protect civil 
liberties and civil rights while also protecting the homeland.  The Office is in a unique 
position to weigh both interests because they have the ability to truly analyze the threat 
152 Harcourt, 2007 and Posner, Richard A. Not a suicide pact: The Constitution in a time of national 
emergency. New  York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
153 Chertoff, Michael; Sutherland, Danieal, Teufel, Hugo, Swire, Peter P.; and Lanigan, Keven. “Homeland 
Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties: A Five Year Review” Heritage Lectures: The Heritage Foundation. 
June 26, 2008. 
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environment.  They see the benefits of increased intelligence collection capabilities and 
the cost of reduced civil liberties protection incurred by citizens.  For example, when 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conducts seizures of electronic information at 
ports of entry, the Office for CRCL knows the advantage law enforcement, and 
intelligence agencies get from this information, the impact it has on citizens’ civil 
liberties, and the risk they run if they do not have this information.154  Although the 
Office’s main mission is to protect citizens’ civil rights and civil liberties, they do that 
while also maintaining the Department of Homeland Security’s ability to protect the 
homeland.155   
 Neither libertarians nor conservatives will be completely satisfied with the 
performance of the Office for CRCL because they do not fully subscribe to protecting 
civil liberties and civil rights in all circumstances, nor do they support national security 
interests in all circumstances.  In keeping tradition with the Pragmatic Authoritarian 
Libertarian position they weigh the costs and benefits of civil liberty sacrifices in the 
name of national security.  Although the main mission of the Office for CRCL, as 
outlined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, is to minimize the impact of DHS policy 
and activities on citizens’ civil liberties and civil rights, their number one priority above 
all else is to ensure national security within the confines of the law.  How grave the threat 
to national security is and how far civil liberties have been compromised continues to be 
discussed in American society. 
Community Perspective on National Security vs Civil Liberties Discussion 
154 Redacted Report: Civil Liberties/Civil Rights Impact Assessment: Border Searches of Electronic 
Devices, 29, December 2011. 
155 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Section 103 
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 The question of liberty in the face of security has been discussed extensively 
amongst think tanks since 9/11.  The discussion has also risen up several times since, 
with the revelations of NSA warrantless surveillance around 2005 and then again with the 
Snowden NSA Leaks in 2013.  Discussions have taken place not only debating both left 
and right positions, but they have explored how the balance between security and liberty 
should be struck and what questions need to be asked when evaluating the balance.156 
 Although groups and scholars differ on where a balance should be struck, many 
do acknowledge a need to evaluate the cost of liberties and the extent of security 
received.  Wittes, while writing for the center-left Brookings Institute, supports asking 
the important questions of whether security policies are really infringing on liberty, and if 
so whose liberty are the infringing on.157  Is it the American people or foreigners abroad? 
Also, he suggests asking the question, could these security policies actually enhance 
liberty.158 He suggests that without security you have no liberty and vice versa.159  This 
idea is also supported from the conservative-right as can be seen in a Heritage Foundation 
paper published by Stimson and Grossman in which they suggest the United States has 
preserved security and liberty by creating policy that protects both.  When they have 
failed to protect one, both security and liberty have suffered160.  The two principals are 
156 Bobbitt, Philip. Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2008, pg. 241. 
157 Wittes, Benjamin. “Against a Crude Balance: Platform Security and the Hostile Symbiosis Between 
Liberty and Security” Harvard Law School/The Brookings Institution: Project on Law and  Security. 
September 21, 2011. 
158 Rosenwzeig, Paul. “Principles for Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism.” The Heritage Foundation. 
January 31 2003. 
159 Witters, 2011 available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/09/21-platform-security-
wittes 
160 Stimson, Charles, and Andrew Grossman. "How Must America Balance Security and Liberty?." 
The Heritage Foundation, December 9 2011.   
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not mutually exclusive and cannot stand on their own.161  Thus, overall, a consensus on 
both the Left and the Right seems to advocate for transparency and a public discussion on 
security policies, but this open discussion is difficult to engage in while also sustaining 
the programs and policies as effective means to secure our nation.162  It has been 
suggested that if the three branches of government are able to agree on security policy 
then a balance has been struck between security and liberty because all branches of 
government have different interests to represent.  Further, this form of agreement 
maintains the programs ability to be an effective means of security because of their 
closed-door discussions.  Without diving deeply in to the discussion of congressional 
oversight of intelligence matters (another paper could be written on congressional 
oversight), it can simply be stated that it is difficult to have open debate on secret security 
issues.  
Summary of National Security Civil Liberties Debate 
 The civil liberty versus national security debate is an increasingly important 
discussion to evaluate, especially during a time when government over reach can have 
such a strong consequence on personal liberty.  When there are grave threats to national 
security, the balance of civil liberties and national security may need to be tilted towards 
national security.  At times of peace, the opposite may be true.  At all times, appropriate 
and effective oversight of national security activities needs to be conducted by both 
internal and external evaluators to ensure liberty is not traded for security in its 
161 Stimson, Charles, and Andrew Grossman. "How Must America Balance Security and Liberty?." 
The Heritage Foundation, December 9 2011.  Available at: 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/12/how-must-america-balance-security-and-liberty 
162 Keiber, Jason. National Security and Civil Liberties. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
December 6 2006. Available at: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060210_sr_v2n3.pdf 
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entirety.163  Evaluating the Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Liberties 
and Civil Rights is one piece of oversight that will ensure the judicious handling of civil 
liberties and civil rights while protecting our nation. 
Establishing a Base Line 
 While evaluating the DHS’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties we need to 
establish a baseline of performance for the office.  To establish this baseline we will look 
at the applicable statutes, regulations, executive orders, and directives that guide the day-
to-day and overall operations of the Office of CRCL.164 This will help in determining 
how the office was established, what they were designed to do, how they were designed 
to do it, and who was to head the organization.  In 2004 the officer for CRCL, Daniel 
Sutherland, presented a one-year review for the office while speaking at The Heritage 
Foundation and outlined these objectives.165 The below baseline will expand on what he 
had outlined. 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 
 The Department of Homeland (DHS) was created out of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 establishing it as a department in the executive branch of the US 
Government.166  It arose out of the Office of Homeland Security in the White House 
that was established 11 days after 9/11.167  The first and foremost role of DHS is to 
prevent terrorist attacks from occurring within the United States.168  Second, if a 
163 Kreimer, Seth F. "Watching the watchers: Surveillance, transparency, and political freedom in the war 
on terror." U. Pa. J. Const. L. 7 (2004): 133. 
164  The full list of legal authorities the CRCL operates under are listed on their Corporate Website at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/legal-authorities-office-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties 
165 Sutherland, Daniel W. "Homeland Security Office For Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: A One-Year 
Review." Heritage Lectures: The Heritage Foundation. (2003). 
166 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 USC 111. 
167 http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security 
168 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 USC 111. 
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terrorist attack were to happen the DHS is tasked with minimizing damage and 
assisting in the recovery of such a disaster.  When the department was created there 
were a lot of issues swirling in Washington. Among policy makers there was a need to 
protect the homeland by increasing focus on preventing and responding to man made 
and natural disasters.  Policy makers needed to strike a balance between going too far 
and creating a domestic intelligence agency, which even in the post 9/11 period did not 
have a lot of support, while still creating an effective countering terrorism and 
homeland security department. 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Section 103 (Officer of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties)  
 Within the HSA of 2002 Congress addressed the need to protect the homeland 
while preserving citizens’ civil rights and civil liberties through the creation of the Office 
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in section 103.169 The Officer would be charged with 
advising the Secretary of Homeland Security and minimizing the impact of homeland 
security on citizens’ rights and liberties.  The President, with consent and 
recommendation of Congress, appoints the Officer for CRCL who sits within the Office 
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.170  The office is unique because it places an officer 
representing civil libertarian ideals and values within an arms reach of the Secretary of 
Homeland Security while directing, advising, and influencing policy. 
 The Officer for CRCL acts within several capacities as outlined in the Homeland 
Security Act and subsequent statutes and regulations. The mission statement for the 
office outlines several objectives.  First, the office ensures the respect and protections of 
civil liberties and civil rights while policy is created and implemented by advising DHS 
169 Sutherland, 2004, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
170 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Section 103 
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leadership, employees, and state and local partners.171  Second, through outreach the 
office communicates with individuals and communities who may be affected by DHS 
policy and educates them on the policy, reasons for implementations, and avenues for 
redress.172 The office advertises redress avenues for citizens and investigates and resolves 
those complaints.  Further, the office educates DHS employees on community concerns 
and acts as a liaison between communities and policy makers advocating and 
representing the interests of both the department and citizens they serve to protect.173  
Lastly, the office leads and promotes DHS’s equal employment opportunity programs 
and promotes workforce diversity.174 
 To accomplish these missions the office is divided into three divisions, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity Division, the Programs and Compliance 
Division, and the Office of Accessible Systems and Technology (OAST). 175  The 
Programs and Compliance Division addresses and investigates allegations of civil 
rights and civil liberties abuses by the Department.  The division also provides DHS 
senior leadership with civil liberties and civil rights advice on current issues and policy 
creation.  In addition to providing senior leadership with guidance, the division 
engages communities to ensure that the department’s activities are not negatively 
171 U.S. Department of Homeland Security; About the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Available 
at: https://www.dhs.gov/office-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties 
172 U.S. Department of Homeland Security; About the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Available 
at: https://www.dhs.gov/office-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties 
173 U.S. Department of Homeland Security; About the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Available 
at: https://www.dhs.gov/office-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties 
174 U.S. Department of Homeland Security; About the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Available 
at: https://www.dhs.gov/office-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties 
175 U.S. Department of Homeland Security; About the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Available 
at: https://www.dhs.gov/office-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties 
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effecting people of disabilities, and diverse racial or ethnicity among other groups.176  
For the purpose of this paper, we will focus primarily but not exclusively on the 
Programs and Compliance Division because of their most direct impact in protecting 
civil liberties and civil rights in the face of national security. 
What has the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties been doing? 
Community Engagement Activities 
 The Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) claims they devote a 
significant amount of resources toward engaging communities within the United States 
that are affected by their policies and helps involve them in the homeland security 
plan.177  Since 2005 the Office for CRCL has been conducting roundtable discussions 
with community groups and leaders.  The goal of these community engagement events 
are to communicate with those that may possibly be affected by DHS policy and ensure 
that their civil liberties and civil rights are protected while also promoting security.178  As 
of fiscal year 2012 the Office for CRCL reported in their annual report to Congress that 
they have established outreach endeavors in 15 cities around the nation working with all 
segments of the community including American Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, South Asians, 
and Middle Eastern.  They have expanded their community outreach in fiscal year 2012 
to include outreach in Latino, Somali, and Asian/Asian Pacific Islander communities.179 
 The Office for CRCL has outlined 4 goals they seek to accomplish through 
community roundtable events. First, the events serve to communicate reliable information 
176 U.S. Department of Homeland Security; About the Antidiscrimination Group. Available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/antidiscrimination-group 
177 Written testimony of DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Acting Officer Tamara Kessler for 
a House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency 
hearing titled “Why Can't DHS Better Communicate with the American People?” 
178 US Department of Homeland Security, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Fiscal Year 2012 
Annual Report to Congress. July 25 2013.July 25, 2013  
179 US DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties FY2013 Report to Congress, July 13 2013. 
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pertaining DHS policy and programs to the community including avenues that 
communities have for redress of issues.180  Second, the round tables serve as a forum 
where DHS officials can receive information and concerns from communities as an on 
the ground collector engaging face to face.181  After they have met with communities and 
obtained information from them, it is also their responsibility to incorporate these lessons 
learned, and ideas back into the policy making process.  Throughout the entire process it 
all serves to deepen the relationship of trust and communication between local 
communities, DHS, and the overall federal government.182 
 The community engagement section of the Office for CRCL has participated in 
over 200 events and roundtables in FY12 and continues to expand the number of cities 
they reach out to.183  In fiscal year 2012 the community outreach section was able to hold 
regular events in 15 cities.  That is an increase from 6 regular meetings in urban areas as 
of fiscal year 2010 and up from 13 regular roundtable meetings in cities across the United 
States in Fiscal Year 2011.184 Topics discussed during these roundtables often include 
immigration and naturalization policies, how communities can work with DHS and the 
federal government to counter violent extremism, roles and responsibilities for law 
enforcement, and even in FY10 the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) was able 
to provide briefs at two roundtables on domestic violent extremism.185  Although the 
FY10 report does not include details of this brief, it would be plausible that this brief 
included threats of violent religious extremism in addition to threats of violent domestic 
180 Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties FY2012 Report to Congress, July 13 2013. P 19 
181 Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties FY2012 Report to Congress, July 13 2013. P 19 
182 Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties FY2012 Report to Congress, July 13 2013. P 19 
183 Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties FY2012 Report to Congress, July 25th 2013 p19 
184 FY10, FY11, FY12 CRCL Reports to Congress.  In late FY10 CRCL added an additional 3 cities to it 
regular meetings for a total of 9 regular meetings. 
185 FY10 CRCL report to congress p. 15. 
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terrorism such as violent white supremacists that may target minority communities.  
Further, it would be plausible if NCTC used this opportunity to educate communities on 
“signs and symptoms” of violent extremism and what to look out for.  This would be in 
line with their countering violent extremism plan outlined by the President in the article 
entitled “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” 
released by the White House.186  Within this article the President outlines the whole of 
government approach to countering violent extremism and how a well-informed and 
engaged citizenry, Federal, State, and Local government are the foundation to CVE. 
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Activities 
 The Office for CRCL plays an important role in the national strategy for 
countering violent extremism and the engagement of local communities is at the forefront 
of this effort to prevent violent extremism.  The office not only engages local 
communities in its effort to CVE but they also meet with delegations from foreign 
countries in its effort.  In October of 2012 the Office for CRCL was able to visit Pakistan 
to meet with leaders, academics, and politicians to discuss The Office for CRCL policies 
and procedures, the importance of countering violent extremism, the role of community 
participation, and the value of civil liberties and civil rights.187  Also, the Office for 
CRCL was able to hold a community round table in London, England to discuss the 
importance of CVE and its application to the Somali population in London.188   
 Further, through the US Embassy in Copenhagen, Denmark DHS CRCL was able 
to meet with Danish Dignitaries to discuss the Department’s CVE program, and 
186 The White House. “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” 
August 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf 
187 CRCL Newsletter October 2012. P.2 
188 CRCL Newsletter October 2012. P.2 
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community engagement and integration efforts.189  The Danish Government is 
recognized in the international community for its countering violent extremist programs 
that are focused on preventing crimes against minority and immigrant populations such as 
their large Somali population.190 The delegation of Danish Diplomats was also able to 
attend an Office for CRCL community roundtable held in Columbus, Ohio where the 
United States has a large Somali immigrant population. The delegation and the other US 
Federal, State, and Local agencies were also able to meet face to face with local 
community leaders, where they claim the community engagement initiatives have 
resulted in reduced racial tensions. 
Complaints/Redress 
 The avenues DHS provides citizens to file complaints and pursue redress have 
been another major initiative for the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.191  The 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 assigned the 
responsibility and authority to DHS Office of CRCL to investigate complaints, in 
addition to reviewing DHS activities and programs for their effect on citizens’ civil 
liberties and civil rights.192  The role and responsibility for investigating complaints and 
violations of civil liberties and civil rights is one task that is contradictory to the Office‘s 
primary roles of pro actively protecting citizens’ civil liberties and civil rights.  When the 
Office for CRCL receives a complaint they forward it to the Office of Inspector General 
(OIG).  The OIG then conducts a preliminary review of the case and if they decline to 
investigate the complaint it is then forwarded back to the Office for CRCL.  At this point 
189 CRCL Newsletter February 2013. Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/crcl-hosts-denmark-delegation 
190 CRCL Newsletter February 2013. Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/crcl-hosts-denmark-delegation 




                                                        
the Office for CRCL makes a determination if they will investigate the complaint or 
forward it to a component agency.  If CRCL determines they will investigate the 
complaint they will conduct their own fact-finding.  If a case is referred to a component 
for investigation they will submit a Report of Investigation (ROI) back to CRCL when 
the factual investigation is completed.  Subsequently, CRCL will provide any 
recommendation for improving policy, practices, or training and CRCL will notify the 
complainant of the results of the investigation.  As of fiscal year 2010 CRCL now asks 
the components to concur or dissent with CRCL’s recommendations and provide a plan 
of actions for implementing recommended changes.193 
Volume of CRCL Complaints 
 The Office of CRCL has increased the number of complaints they have received 
and the number of investigations they are involved in over the past five fiscal years.  
From fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2012 they received 157, 155, 195, 298, and 253 
complaints respectively.  They have also closed 142, 144, 118, 219, and 279 complaints 
from 2008 through 2012 respectively.194  There has been an obvious increase in the 
number of complaints the Office of CRCL has been receiving, processing, investigating, 
and closing.  This increase in complaints can be the result of many things, but we will 
analyze this trend further in the next section of this paper. 
 The Office For CRCL has placed significant effort in advertising avenues citizens 
have for redress.  They have used the various community engagement events mentioned 
above to advertise and encourage citizens who have encountered issues whether it be 
discrimination at Transportation Security Administration (TSA) airport security check 
193 CRCL Report to Congress FY10, page 30 
194 Report to congress, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012. 
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points, or during Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) investigations, arrests, and 
detentions.  In fiscal year 2010 the Office for CRCL implemented a fully online 
complaint form that persons can use to file complaints.195  Further, in January of 2012 
DHS, Office for CRCL created a social media presence on Facebook that informs and 
facilitates the public on the process for filing complaints and seeking redress for issues 
involving DHS and the Federal, State, and Local governments.196 
Proactive Policy Review 
 One of the unique roles the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties plays 
within the Department of Homeland Security and National Security Sector of the Federal 
government is its proactive role in limiting national and homeland security policies’ 
impact on citizens’ civil liberties and civil rights.  The Office for CRCL has the ability to 
influence and review policy that DHS leadership is developing before it is 
implemented.197  By design the office, a self declared libertarian one, represents the 
interest of citizens’ civil rights and civil liberties during the policy making process. 
 Very little information has been released about the substantive contributions the 
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties adds to the policy making process.  When they 
have been asked by the media, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, and 
Congress, among other inquiring groups to release information regarding the 
contributions they make in reviewing policy they have fought vigorously to keep 
deliberations and advice given to DHS private.198  They have argued that the ability to 
195 Report to Congress 2010 
196 Report to Congress 2012 
197 Sutherland, Daniel W. "Homeland Security Office For Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: A One-Year 
Review.  "Heritage Lectures: The Heritage Foundation. (2003). 
198 Chertoff, Michael; Sutherland, Danieal, Teufel, Hugo, Swire, Peter P.; and Lanigan, Keven. “Homeland 
Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties: A Five Year Review” Heritage Lectures: The Heritage Foundation. 
June 26, 2008. 
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have an open and continuous dialogue with members of the Department is built upon a 
foundation of trust.  If they were to release information that disclosed essentially how the 
“sausage was made” they would not be included in policy discussion in the future.  How 
could you work with someone to constructively build effective policy if what you tell him 
or her could be held against you or your Office in an OIG report, Congressional Hearing, 
or newspaper?  They argue you cannot and thus have kept most information pertaining to 
policy review and discussions private.199 
Civil Liberties/Civil Rights Impact Assessments 
 One of the ways the Office for CRCL influences policy and programs within DHS 
is through Impact Assessments.  These CRCL Impact Assessments are released to the 
public via DHS.gov, DHS’s public website, and is a more transparent way of disclosing 
DHS activities and their effects on citizens civil liberties and civil rights.  Impact 
Assessments are initiated through requests from leadership, The Office for CRCL, or 
designated by law.200  The CRCL Impact Assessments reviews department policies, 
programs, and initiatives to determine their effect on civil liberties and civil rights.  
Impact assessments also include recommendations for program or policy in order to 
better safeguard civil liberties and civil rights while remaining effective means of 
ensuring homeland security.201 
 Since fiscal year 2008, the Office for CRCL has conducted numerous Impact 
Assessments including several reviews of high profile DHS programs including two 
reviews of the national fusion center network in 2008 and early 2013, review of CBP’s 
border searches of electronic devices, and the Future Attribute Screening Technology 
199 Chertoff, & Sutherland 2008. 
200 Report to Congress 2012 
201 Report to Congress, 2012 
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(FAST) used for screening passengers, among other assessments.  What follows will be a 
cursory review of the substantive information included in these impact assessments by 
looking at their contents, analysis, and recommendations that result from the Office for 
CRCL conducting these impact assessments. 
 Within the 2013 “Civil Liberties/Civil Rights Impact Assessment: DHS  
Support to the National Network of Fusion Centers” the Office For CRCL included 
several recommendations that would better protect citizens’ civil liberties and civil rights.  
The first recommendation was that fusion centers that are using federally funded criminal 
intelligence databases abide by the federal regulations outlined in the Criminal 
Intelligence Systems Operating Policies (28 C.F.R. Part 23) which directs “law 
enforcement agencies on how to operate criminal intelligence information systems 
effectively while protecting individuals’ privacy and constitutional rights during the 
collection, storage, and dissemination of criminal intelligence information.”202  Second, 
the assessment recommends the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) (the 
principal office for directing fusion centers operations) assist fusion centers with writing 
implementing plans on privacy and civil rights/civil liberties.203  The third 
recommendation coming out of the 2013 review of fusion centers was that DHS, FEMA, 
CRCL, I&A, and Office Of Privacy update how grants are distributed to fusions centers.  
They recommended leveraging the grant issuing process to ensure that fusion centers are 
202 http://www.iir.com/WhatWeDo/Criminal_Justice_Training/28CFR/ 
Recommendation is found in: “Civil Rights/Civil Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the 
National Network of Fusion Centers” March 1 2013, Department of Homeland Security, Report to 
Congress. 
203 “Civil Rights/Civil Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion 
Centers” March 1 2013, Department of Homeland Security, Report to Congress. 
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developing, implementing, and following civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy 
guidelines in addition to establishing steadfast policies.204 
 Completed in fiscal year 2012, the Office for CRCL conducted an Impact 
Assessment entitled “Border Searches of Electronic devices”.  Of the numerous impact 
assessments conducted by the Office for CRCL, this impact assessment received the most 
public attention likely because of the controversial program it was reviewing.  Border 
searches of electronic devices contest sharply with citizen’s 1st and 4th amendment rights 
and the impact assessment directly address these concerns.205  The Office for CRCL had 
five recommendations when assessing the program governing border searches.  First, 
when Custom and Border Protection (CBP) Officers conduct searches they accurately 
record why they are conducting the search.  Second, within their policy, expressively 
state that it is impermissible to conduct searches based on race or ethnicity, and thirdly 
institute a review process for ensuring certain groups are not unreasonably subjected to 
border searches. Further, if program data reveals that certain ethnicities or races are being 
subjected to abnormally high number of border searches, those ports of entry institute a 
supervisory review of border searches.206  Fifth, CBP as a whole needs to improve the 
mechanism they use to notify passengers when they were subjected to a border search 
and their avenues of redress (DHS TRIP207).  Within the Impact Assessment released to 
the public the Office For CRCL redacted substantial portions of its legal reasoning and 
204 “Civil Rights/Civil Liberties Impact Assessment: DHS Support to the National Network of Fusion 
Centers” March 1 2013, Department of Homeland Security, Report to Congress. 
205 Several organizations have expressed their concerns with DHS CBP and ICE border searches including 
most notably the American Civil Liberties Union. 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-immigrants-rights-national-security/dhs-releases-
disappointing-civil 
206 Redacted Report: Civil Liberties/Civil Rights Impact Assessment: Border Searches of Electronic 
Devices, 29 December 2011.  
207 Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 
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justification pertaining to the programs legality and constitutional permissibility.  The 
redacted Impact Assessment does release parts of its reasoning which generalizes CBP 
and ICE’s longstanding legal authority recognized by both Congress and the Courts to 
conduct suspicion less border searches.  Further, CBP and ICE’s conduction of electronic 
searches are an extension of their authority and mission to prevent, deter, and apprehend 
contraband from entering the United States.208 
Analysis/Findings 
 After performing an overview of select missions of the Office for CRCL, we have 
determined they are fulfilling their mission as outlined by the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 (HSA), The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
and applicable regulations, executive orders, and directives.  The HSA of 2002 ensured 
that with the establishment of DHS citizens’ civil liberties and civil rights would not been 
diminished by creating an Officer for CRCL.  The Office has grown to encompass many 
missions that are designed to review, investigate, and recommend changes that further the 
protection of civil liberties and civil rights while ensuring homeland security. 
Overall Utility of the Office for Civil Liberties and Civil Rights 
 The premise for which the Office for CRCL was created was to be a proactive 
measure to ensure the DHS protected citizens’ civil liberties and civil rights in its 
Homeland Security effort and it has succeeded in doing so.  The Secretary of Homeland 
Security and the Officer for CRCL in speeches given at the Heritage Foundation argued 
that the Office for CRCL is one layer of protection in the system of oversight.  There are 
multiple parts of the federal government and public that play a role in conducting 
208 Redacted Report: Civil Liberties/Civil Rights Impact Assessment: Border Searches of Electronic 
Devices, 29 December 2011. 
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oversight including the Office for Inspector General, Congressional oversight 
committees, and the Press.  These elements of oversight traditionally play an 
investigative and reactive role aimed at exposing issues after they have occurred.  The 
unique nature of the Office for CRCL is, in its proactive role, getting in front of potential 
issues before they become larger issues effecting citizens.  Upon reviewing the overall 
function of the Office for Civil Liberties and Civil Rights it can be determined that they 
play an effective role in overseeing and protecting citizens’ civil liberties and civil rights 
by conducting impact assessments, investigating complaints, and conducting community 
engagement but could improve on the issues outline below. 
Effectiveness of Community Engagement 
 Is this the best office within DHS to be involved in the countering violent 
extremism effort and are they doing an effective job in doing so?  The Office, through its 
community engagement programs, plays a significant role in countering violent 
extremism in the United States but the impact these engagement events play in shaping 
policy is unclear. First, the federal government approaches countering violent extremism 
in a multifaceted way as outlined in both National Strategy and the Strategic 
Implementation plan for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) released by the White 
House.209  Conducting and being involved in community meetings and engagements at 
the local level is an integral part of CVE.  The fact that the Office for CRCL has 
increased the number of cities they are currently holding round table discussions in 
indicates that they feel there are benefits in continuing and expanding the role of 
209 The White House “Strategic Implementation plan for empowering local partners to prevent violent 
extremism in the United States” December 2011http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf 
The White House. “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” August 
2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf 
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community engagements. In addition to increasing the geographic and demographic 
footprint of these community round tables, they are holding them more frequently which 
is giving citizens increased access to the federal government and the people making 
policy that effects them.  
 The Office needs to show better substantive evidence that it is using information 
gathered during engagement opportunities to better inform policy makers and adjusting 
existing policy to better protect citizen’s civil liberties and civil rights. Creating a forum 
in which citizens can be heard is only one part of the process to ensure citizens’ rights are 
protected.  The DHS, Office for CRCL, and Federal Government as a whole, need to use 
this information and lessons learned from community events to implement policy that 
respects and protects citizens’ civil liberties and civil rights.  Additionally, the Office, 
across all its programs, has recommended that DHS increase avenues for redress.  This 
includes advertising redress avenues at community engagement events and, as seen in the 
Impact Assessment for Electronic Border Searches, increase awareness among people 
subjected to searches.  The Office claims that when they receive a complaint and conduct 
an investigation they provide a plan and course of action to remedy the issue, but there is 
little evidence provided in their publicly available reports to show how information 
received from citizens effects policy and on what scale. 
Increase the publicity of community engagement events 
 The Office also needs to publicly announce in advance when community 
engagement events occur.  The Office for CRCL releases a monthly news letter available 
on both its social media account (Facebook) and its public website summarizing past 
community events and round table discussions but it does not publicize its involvement in 
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community events prior to their occurrence.  In researching this paper and in multiple 
visits to their website210 it was impossible to find information on where the Office of 
CRCL was holding community round tables or engagement events despite their claims 
that they hold events in the Washington DC metropolitan area.  In their monthly 
newsletter they provide summaries of events after they have occurred.  The office may 
not publicize their community events in advance to limit the number of attendees and 
only engage a targeted audience that they are most interested in talking to.   
Lack of Transparency in Policy/Product Review 
 The Office for CRCL lacks transparency in its role providing proactive policy 
review and recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security and it’s Secretary.  
One of the main missions of the Office is to provide advice, recommendations, and 
justifications for policy while it is being developed and worked to avoid issues and 
overreach after policy has been implemented.  The Office argues that it needs to have the 
ability to provide legal advice and opinions to the Department, the Secretary, and his/her 
staff that will not be released to the public.  If the advice and recommendations the Office 
provides were to be released to the public it is argued it would hinder their working 
relationship and their ability to have an open dialogue with the Department.211  
 The Secretary of DHS and the Officer for CRCL argue the Office works because 
of the various oversight mechanisms that review activities of the government.  There are 
other offices that are responsible for investigating issues after the fact and revealing 
issues such as Congressional oversight committees, OIG, and the media as previously 
210 The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties website can be accessed at https://www.dhs.gov/office-
civil-rights-and-civil-liberties 
211 Chertoff, Michael; Sutherland, Danieal, Teufel, Hugo, Swire, Peter P.; and Lanigan, Keven. “Homeland 
Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties: A Five Year Review” Heritage Lectures: The Heritage Foundation. 
June 26,  2008. 
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mentioned.  The proactive nature of the Office was intended to be another layer of review 
and insurance rather than another mechanism to right scathing reports exposing abuse and 
misuse of authority, although the importance of that method of protection cannot be 
under valued.212 
 The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties should release metrics on the 
activities and volume of work that is done to proactively review policy, reports, and 
programs.  The office could report metrics on how many reports they review, how much 
time they spend advising leadership, what types of reports they review 
(Intelligence/Policy), what types of advice is given, whether the report was cancelled, 
released with revisions, recommendations not incorporated, et cetera.  Similar metrics are 
released for the Office’s activities involving complaints and redress investigations that 
allow the public to evaluate the areas of issue with the department without releasing 
specific information about complaints or jeopardizing peoples privacy.  Releasing metrics 
to inform the public would increase transparency for the Office’s role in reviewing policy 
and internal reports without disclosing specific advice, legal reasoning, or internal 
proceedings that would jeopardize the Office’s working relationship with the rest of the 
department. 
Conclusion 
 The Office for Civil Liberties and Civil Rights within the Department of 
Homeland Security is a unique office within intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
that is designed to proactively protect citizens’ civil liberties and civil rights before they 
are adversely impacted by government policy.  The office is succeeding in playing an 
212 Chertoff, Michael; Sutherland, Danieal, Teufel, Hugo, Swire, Peter P.; and Lanigan, Keven. “Homeland 
Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties: A Five Year Review” Heritage Lectures: The Heritage Foundation. 
June 26,  2008. 
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important role of oversight and fulfilling its mission by conducting impact assessments, 
conducting community engagement events, and investigating citizens’ applications for 
redress.  Within the national security versus civil liberties debate the Office plays an 
important and effective role as an oversight mechanism to ensure the balance between 
security and liberty is being evaluated on its merit.  Although the office is fulfilling its 
missions as it is vaguely written it could improve on several of its core functions to 
provide more transparency. 
 This report was written in response to two lectures given at the Heritage 
Foundation in 2004 and 2008, which conducted a 1-year review and a 5-year review of 
the DHS and the Office for CRCL.  Additionally this paper addresses concerns in Seth 
Kriemer’s article “Watching the Watchers” which recommended more active analysis be 
conducted into whether internal surveillance mechanisms such as the Office for CRCL 
are effective, appropriately funded, and/or motivated to have “salutary impact” during the 
review of sensitive data and programs.213 In response to these inquires, and in an effort to 
continually analyze the balance between freedom and national security, the Office for 
CRCL is an effective piece of the overall system designed to conduct oversight on 
national security programs.   
 Further research could be conducted to identify the effectiveness of other agencies 
oversight mechanism and compare if similar pro-active review offices such as the Civil 
Liberties and Privacy Office (CLPO) within the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) and the Office of Privacy within Terrorist Screen Center (TSC) are 
effectively protecting citizen’s civil liberties, civil rights, and privacy.  In addition to 
213 Kreimer, S. F. (2004). Watching the watchers: Surveillance, transparency, and political freedom in the 
war on terror. U. Pa. J. Const. L., 7, 133. 
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looking at other similar offices, additional research could be conducted to discover and 
analyze additional information pertaining to the Office for CRCL proactive policy review 























 In conclusion, during the post 9/11 era of increased security and counter terrorism 
policies, the government has not responded by restricting citizens’ freedom and has 
implemented effective means to balance civil rights, civil liberties, privacy and security.   
 First, conventional wisdom suggests that after a significant terrorist attack occurs 
in a country, governments respond by increasing security and decreasing citizens’ 
freedom.  Chapter one concludes that of the nine countries analyzed, there is no 
consistent observable relationship between the magnitude of a terrorist attack and a 
countries’ level of freedom after that point.   For three of the nine countries studied, 
Turkey, Pakistan and Russia were the only countries to see a slight decrease in civil 
liberties after an increase in terrorism, albeit small.  For the United States, Great Britain, 
and Egypt no relationship was observed between the level of freedom after an increase in 
the level of terrorism.  For the remaining three countries studied, Spain, Georgia and 
Saudi Arabia saw slight increases in the level of freedom after increases in the level of 
terrorism within those countries.   
 The Freedom House publication and the START database were useful tools in 
determining a relationship between terrorism and freedom, although they had their limits 
and flaws.  First, the seven-point freedom index limited the ability for small shifts in 
freedom to be observed.  Further, an index that represented only civil liberties would be 
more sensitive to changes in government policies and actions. The Freedom House 
publication that maintained a 60-point civil liberties index was useful, although it only 
contained ten years of historical data.  Second, a control for a countries predisposition to 
civil liberties would be beneficial in future research.  A government’s reaction to a 
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terrorist event is likely to be determined by its societies’ tolerance to government control 
and risk of attack.  The use of the START GTD database and the Freedom House index 
were advances in the analysis of the relationship between security and freedom. 
 Second, Fusion Centers combine traditional roles of law enforcement and 
intelligence officials that require extra scrutiny to ensure Fusion Centers do not infringe 
on citizens’ freedom in their efforts to protect the homeland.  There is no evidence found 
within the second chapter that suggests Fusion Centers reduce citizens’ freedom, which 
concludes DHS has taken sufficient steps to ensure the protection of citizens’ rights, 
liberties, and privacy while protecting the homeland.  DHS has developed guidelines, 
reviews, and training for Fusion Centers to ensure protection of citizens’ rights in their 
effort to protect the homeland.  Further, DHS conducts an annual report to Congress that 
details the status of the National Fusion Center Program including metrics on the 
development of measures that protect civil liberties and privacy, such as publicly 
published privacy policies and the number of privacy officers. 
 The Fusion Center program is a complex network that operates in partnership 
with DHS but is owned and operated primarily by State or Local entities making DHS 
direction and guidance difficult to administer and enforce.  Although DHS has been 
successful in developing guidelines, training, and creating standards in consultations with 
Fusion Centers, more could be done to ensure the protection of citizens’ civil liberties, 
rights, and privacy amongst the network of Fusion Centers.  First amongst those efforts is 
developing outreach efforts that engage communities Fusion Centers operate in to 
diminish the opaqueness of their activity.   Additionally, officers within Fusion Centers 
that represent citizens’ equities in relation to privacy and civil liberties should ensure that 
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their primary purpose is to review and protect citizens’ civil rights, liberties, and privacy.  
DHS’s 2012 report to congress identified that most officers who conduct oversight also 
have additional duties potentially creating a conflict of interest for the privacy officer.  
Overall, DHS is operating within in its requirements to ensure civil rights and civil 
liberties are not diminished while protecting the homeland and enabling information 
sharing.  No evidence was found to suggest negligent or systematic infringement of 
citizens’ civil liberties, rights, or privacy.  The National Network of Fusion Centers has 
increased measures to ensure the protection of citizens’ and build trust amongst the 
community they serve, according to the DHS reports reviewed in this chapter. 
 Finally, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties has been an effective civil 
libertarian within DHS advocating for and proactively protecting citizens’ civil rights and 
civil liberties while in pursuit of securing the homeland.  The office plays and important 
role and is successful in proactively protecting citizens’ by conducting training, impact 
assessments, community engagement events and investigating applications for redress 
submitted by citizens.  The office is fulfilling its missions as defined by law although it 
could improve on several of its core functions.   
 The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties could improve on its transparency 
related to upcoming public engagements, review of classified programs or products, and 
reporting of metrics on activities.  Prior to community engagement events taking place 
the Office does not provide public advertisements for community events, despite their 
frequent engagements with the public.  Events are often highlighted in their newsletter, or 
social media profiles after the fact.  Further, little information is provided on their review 
of classified programs or products because of the necessity of a trusted confidential 
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relationship claimed by DHS.  Although this is may true, information such as metrics, 
type of review, or outcome could be publicized without jeopardizing client-advisor 
confidentiality. The Office provides a unique proactive role ensuring the protection of 
citizens’ rights, and liberties in the effort to secure the homeland. 
 Further research could be done to conduct case studies to examine when programs 
that may intrude upon citizens’ liberties or privacy are uncovered where the failure 
occurred allowing for the victims’ rights to be intruded.  Additionally, further research 
could examine events such as the NSA public disclosures, and determine whether laws 
and policy were broken or if the program represented poor policy that was against public 
sentiment. 
 In conclusion, government reaction to terrorism is not unbalanced intrusions on 
citizens’ civil rights, civil liberties, or privacy and the government has implemented 
effective means to ensure the respect and protection of citizens’ within their duty to 
protect the homeland against advisories.  Thomas Hobbes argued in the Levitarian that 
citizens enter into a social contract in society giving up some autonomy and freedom in 
order to ensure security in their lives.  DHS and the US Government has balanced 
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